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Institutional and Regulatory frameworks of Privatisation and FDI:  
A comparative study between Egypt and Argentina 
By 
Rania Ihab Naguib 
University of Bath  
and 
University of the West of England, Bristol1 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims at investigating the difference between the Egyptian and Argentinean 
approach to privatisation and FDI and how their different policies, institutions and 
regulations affected the progress of their respective privatisation programmes and FDI 
participation. 
 
The analysis indicates that, in Egypt, the legal framework of privatisation did not 
explicitly incorporate FDI participation. FDI regulations were developed separately from 
privatisation regulations. As a result, a foreign investor in Egypt is faced with multiple 
laws and multiple regulating agencies for FDI. Unlike in Argentina, the legal framework 
of privatisation explicitly incorporated the participation of FDI, and FDI regulations were 
totally liberalised. This explains why FDI participation in Argentine privatisation during 
1989 – 2000 accounted for 63% of privatisation proceeds, while, in Egypt, FDI 
participation accounted for only 24% of privatisation proceeds during 1993 – 2000.  
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1. Introduction: 
 
Both Egypt and Argentina are middle-income countries that, like many developing 
countries, suffered from macroeconomic structural problems such as high inflation rates 
and high external debt ratios.  In the 1980s, due to the crash in oil prices and the 
reluctance of major international lenders to lend to developing countries amid the foreign 
debt crisis of the 1980s, the macroeconomic problems in both Egypt and Argentina 
reached to their peak. Inflation in Argentina, for example, reached to 3000% and external 
debt as a ratio of GDP reached to 85% in 1989. Similarly, in Egypt, inflation rates 
reached to 23.86% in 1986, and external debt ratio reached to 128.16% in 1987 (WDI, 
2002)2.  
 
One of the factors that effected such sever problems was the inefficiency of the large 
public sector in each country. State owned enterprises (SOEs) were constituting burden 
on the economies of these countries and significantly contributing to the aggravation of 
their macroeconomic problems. In Argentina, for example, by the end of 1988, the 
external debt of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) reached to over $ 11 billion3, while 
in Egypt, over the period of 1975 – 1989, the Egyptian government received US$14.98 
billion from USAID; out of which US$ 14.23 billion (i.e. 95%) went to the government, 
where US$ 1.2 billion (i.e. around 8%) went directly to the industrial SOEs. The private 
sector received only 5% of the USAID received during this period (i.e. US$ 751 million).4  
 
As a result, the 1980s witnessed a surge in the application of economic reform and 
structural adjustment programmes that aimed at addressing these common structural 
macroeconomic problems in the developing countries. These programmes depended 
mainly on two policies: Stabilisation policies; as a short-run solution to the inflation and 
external debt problems, and privatisation policies; as a long-run solution to the 
structural problems of the economy. This paper focuses on the privatisation policies.  
 
However, while some developing countries went through privatisation programmes fairly 
quickly and privatised all of their enlisted SOEs within the agreed upon time scale (e.g. 
Argentina), others progressed slowly and reached to a halt in the execution of their 
programmes (e.g. Egypt). Moreover, due to domestic capital shortages in the developing 
countries, in general, the completion of privatisation programmes oftenly required the 
participation of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, developing countries differed in 
terms of their reliability on, or welcoming, the participation of FDI in their privatisation 
programmes. While some (e.g. Argentina) welcomed and explicitly demanded the 
participation of FDI into their privatisation programmes, others (e.g. Egypt), were a little 
bit conservative and sometimes reluctance to allow FDI to participate in the privatisation 
of their SOEs. 
 
In the cases of Egypt and Argentina, this difference was very apparent. Both Egypt and 
Argentina started their privatisation programmes around the same time (i.e. in 1991 and 
1989, respectively). The Egyptian privatisation programme incorporated more SOEs than 
the Argentine programme (i.e. 314 non-financial SOEs in Egypt compared to 297 SOEs 
in Argentina). However, within the first five years of their programme, Argentina 
privatised two third of its SOEs, while Egypt took 10 years to privatise two third of its 
SOEs. Moreover, by 20005, Argentina received $44.5 billion in privatisation proceeds, 
                                                 
2 See tables 1 and 2 in the appendix. 
3 The World Bank (1993), pp. 1-2, and Alexander and Corti (1993), p. 2. 
4 Aly (1992), p.55. 
5 By the year 2000, Argentina had finished its privatisation programme. There were few remaining shares that were sold between 
2000 and 2003. On the other hand, the programme in Egypt reached to a halt in 2000, then there were one or two sales in 2002. 
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where 67% of them were FDI, while Egypt received $4.5 billion in privatisation proceeds, 
out of which 22% represented FDI. This paper compares between the institutional and 
regulatory frameworks of privatisation and FDI in Egypt and Argentina during the 1990s 
and analyse how they may explain the difference in the completion rates of, and FDI 
participation in, their privatisation programmes. The analysis focuses on the period of 
1988 – 2000 as it was the period when privatisation was at its peak in both countries. 
 
The paper develops as follows: section 2 compares between the size and performance of 
the public sectors in Egypt and Argentina before the start of privatisation. Section 3 
presents a brief overview of the privatisation programme in each country. Section 4 
outlines the institutional and regulatory frameworks of FDI, while section 5 outlines the 
institutional and frameworks of privatisation in each country. Section 6 draws some 
lessons and policy implications from the comparison between Egypt and Argentina. 
Finally, the conclusion of the paper is presented in section 7. 
 
2. Public Sectors in Egypt and Argentina: 
 
Both the Egyptian and Argentinean economies were dominated by large public sectors for 
quiet a long time. In Egypt, the economy was transformed from a private, market-
oriented economy to a socialist, centrally-planned economy in the 1960s when the 
government started to nationalise many private companies and established large SOEs 
(industrial and financial) to provide goods and services. The dominance of the public 
sector on the Egyptian economy lasted for 30 years. In Argentina, on the other hand, the 
dominance of the public sector on the economy lasted for 40 years, as nationalisation 
started in the 1946 (World Bank, 1993).   
 
The Egyptian public sector includes four major institutions: Local government productive 
enterprises, Service authorities, Economic authorities and Public Enterprises or state-
owned enterprises. All four institutions are involved in economic activities; however the 
last two are the main agents due to their size and contribution to the economy. Economic 
authorities cover strategic sectors such as Suez Canal, petroleum, utilities, supply, 
health and social insurance. There are more than 60 economic authorities in Egypt, 
employing around 3% of the labour force, and produce 20% of GDP. These economic 
authorities are organised as semi-autonomous corporations (e.g. Egyptian General 
Petroleum Corporation -EGPC). On the other hand, Public enterprises are involved in all 
activities (e.g. mining, construction, tourism, food and beverages …etc). They account for 
10% of the GDP and employ around 6% of the labour force.6 Public enterprises have 
constituted larger burden on the government budget than economic authorities. The 
deficit of non-financial public enterprises, for example, accounted for about 30% of total 
government deficit in the 1980s, while economic authorities sometimes achieved surplus 
such as in the early 1980s.7 For that reason, in addition to be covering strategic assets 
such as the Suez Canal, the Egyptian government has not been keen to privatise the 
economic authorities. Rather, the focus of privatisation was on non-financial public 
enterprises. 
 
The government controlled all activities of SOEs concerning production, employment, 
pricing, and obtaining raw materials. Managers of SOEs were directly appointed by the 
supervised Ministry, and they had little or no power to affect prices, wages, output or 
employment. Managers’ rewards or continuance in their position were not tied up to their 
performance, rather their position depended on their relationship with the political 
regime. As such, managers were working to meet whatever political or social objectives 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Hence, this paper focuses on the period when privatisation was at its peak in both countries, and that covers the period of 1993- 2000 
in Egypt, and 1989 – 2000 in Argentina. 
6 Business Environment Task Force – BETF (2000), p. 6 
7 Ott (1991), p. 204. 
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the government had and they did not have any incentive to improve the performance of 
their enterprises.8 Even when the government attempted to decentralise the decision 
making process in early 1980s by creating holding companies (HCs)9 that were to be 
responsible for managing SOEs, the performance and organisational behaviour of the 
SOEs did not change. SOEs became affiliated companies to holding companies. The 
board of directors of the HC are responsible for appointing the managers of SOEs. 
However, the board of directors of the HC itself is appointed by the government, and 
sometimes it is headed by the Minister of the supervising ministry. The central 
government was still in control of the activities of the SOEs via the HCs (Ott, 1991; and 
Sherif and Soos, 1992). One may argue that rather than decentralising and liberalising 
the decision-making process in the SOEs, this has led to more bureaucracy in the 
decision-making process. 
Figure 1: The hierarchy of control of the public sector in Egypt 
 
The government used its pricing policy to grant implicit subsidies to the public and to the 
SOEs and to create favourable position for SOEs over private enterprises. This was done 
via classifying SOEs output into ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ products. The prices of 
essential products were kept lower than the cost or the market value to make sure that 
they are affordable by the wide range of the public. Price differential was allowed for non-
essential products, where public sector users are charged lower prices than private 
sector users (Ott, 1991).  
 
The favourable position of the SOEs was reinforced by other policies and laws such as 
trade policies, exchange rate policies, and labour laws. In the 1960s, SOEs were totally 
protected with import-substitution policies and the government objective was to achieve 
self-sufficiency and serve the domestic market. Import and Export activities were totally 
dominated by SOEs, while the private sector was to purchase its needs from the SOEs. 
During 1970s – early 1980s trade was partially liberalised; tariffs on intermediate goods 
that are not produced domestically and on capital goods were lowered, while tariff on 
consumer or luxury goods remained high. The private sector was allowed to engage in 
direct import and export, but with some restrictions (i.e. obtaining a license from the 
government). 
 
The public sector dominated the economic activities in Egypt for long time. During 1974 
– 1986, the public sector accounted for 40% of GDP and controlled over 70% of industrial 
output while the private sector controlled only 23% to 33% of industrial output.10 
Employment figures are another indicator of the growing size of the public sector. The 
                                                 
8 See Ott (1991) and Sherif and Soos (1992) for more details on the economic performance of public enterprises. 
9 Six holding companies were created by Law no. 79 for 1983. They were to act as a coordinating body between SOEs and the 6 
supervising ministries at the time (i.e. Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Housing, Ministry 
of Health, and Ministry of Economy) (Ott, 1991, p. 199).  
10 Ott (1991); Aly (1992); Tesche and Tohamy (1994); and Ayubi (1995). 
Ministries 
 
Holding companies (since 1983) 
Board of Directors 
SOEs (or affiliated companies since 1983) 
Managers 
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percentage of population employed by the public sector grew from 2.2% in 1952 to 3.8% 
in 1970. By mid-1980s, 10% of the population were employed by the public sector; which 
represents 35% of the labour force.11 
 
The protectionist policies, in addition to managing the SOEs based on socio-political 
rather than economic criteria, adversely affected the performance of the public 
enterprises. SOEs were incurring losses and their deficit almost doubled from 3.9% to 
8.4% of GDP between 1973 to 1983 (Ott, 1991, p.204). Financing this deficit is born 
mainly by the government budget. The fiscal burden of SOEs on the budget of the central 
government in the second half of the 1970s was above 30% of GDP12. The second source 
of financing the SOEs deficit was borrowing from domestic banks. During 1974 – 1985, 
inflation rates were higher than nominal interest rates, which led to negative effective 
interest rates. This encouraged SOEs to borrow excessively (Sherif and Soos, 1992) and 
led to an increase in public debt13. The ratio of public debt to GDP increased from 
approximately 17% in 1974 to 84% in 1985.14  
 
SOEs had also access to foreign resources either via borrowing (in domestic currency) 
from governmental funds that were initially obtained from foreign loans, or via borrowing 
directly from foreign resources in the form of suppliers’ or buyers’ credits. In the first 
case, servicing the foreign debt is the responsibility of the central government, while in 
the later case; it is the responsibility of the SOE. However, due to poor monitoring or 
regulations from the part of the central government on SOEs direct borrowing, the debt-
servicing burden of many SOEs’ direct foreign borrowing was shifted to the central 
government.15 Ultimately, the inefficient performance of SOEs had its toll on external 
debt, where external debt ratio reached to above 120% of GDP by mid-1980s16. 
 
In Argentina, on the other hand, prior to the 1940s, the contribution of SOEs in the 
Argentine economy was of little significance, except in the petroleum sector as the 
petroleum state-owned enterprise; Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) dominated that 
sector since the 1920s. The pressure for nationalisation started in the 1940s; almost two 
decades before nationalisation took place in Egypt. In Mid-1940s, the government of 
President Juan Péron started in nationalising foreign-owned enterprises and establishing 
new SOEs using the wealth that have been accumulated during the World War II.  
 
Argentine SOEs are mostly concentrated in the infrastructure sector (i.e. 
telecommunication, electricity, water, and transport), in the primary sector (i.e. 
petroleum and natural gas), and some are in the manufacturing sector (e.g. defence 
industries, petrochemicals, and steel).17 Some SOEs are owned by the national 
government, while others are owned by provincial and municipal authorities. By 1989, 
there were 260 in the nonfinancial sector and 37 in the financial sector (i.e. totalling 297 
SOEs in Argentina). The national government owned 55% of the SOEs in the nonfinancial 
sector.18 
 
SOEs in Argentina faced the usual problems of over hiring, poor performance and 
contribution to output, and financial and operational inefficiencies. In 1989, the 
operating deficit of the largest 13 SOEs (excluding defence industries) was around $ 4 
billion19 (i.e. around 5% of current GDP). By the first half of 1990, this operating deficit 
                                                 
11 Aly (1992), p.55. 
12 Based on World Bank data provided in Ott (1991). 
13 Public debt is defined by the WDI (2002) as “long-term external obligations of public debtors, including the 
national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of either), and autonomous public bodies” 
14 Calculated from WDI (2002). 
15 Sherif and Soos (1992), pp. 66 - 67. 
16  See table 1 in the appendix. 
17 Gerchunoff and Coloma (1993), p. 251. 
18 Alexander and Corti (1993), p. 1; Shaikh et al. (1996), p. 22. 
19 Saba and Manzetti (1997), p.355, and Pastor Jr. and Wise (1999), p. 487. 
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has increased by 35%. Four SOEs – YPF, the telephone company, the gas company and 
the railways, accounted for half of these losses. Moreover, by the end of 1988, the 
external debt of the SOEs reached to over $ 11 billion.20 In terms of the size of public 
sector employment, total employees working in the SOEs were approximately 310,000 
employees in 199021. This represents about 2.5% of the labour force or 1% of the 
population22. The poor performance of SOEs is reflected by the low share of their output 
in GDP and investment. In the late 1980s, the share of SOEs output in GDP was around 
7% (which is less than the world average of 9.4%) while the share of SOEs output in GDI 
was around 21% (which is less than the developing countries average of 27%)23. 
 
The comparison between the Egyptian and Argentinean public sectors indicates that the 
former is larger in terms of size, contribution to output and employment; implying that 
SOEs in Egypt were more involved in the economy than those in Argentina. Furthermore, 
the financial performance of SOEs in Egypt was worse than those in Argentina. Such 
inefficiencies in both countries constituted large burdens on their government budgets 
and were one of the motives to engage in privatisation and restructuring the economy in 
both countries. 
  
3. Privatisation programmes in Egypt and Argentina: 
 
Both Egypt and Argentina started their privatisation programmes in response to the 
inefficiencies of their SOEs, and both programmes started with difficult macroeconomic 
conditions. Egypt was suffering more from the external debt burden (i.e. In 1989, 
external debt ratio to GDP was 111.74% in Egypt, as opposed to 85.15% in Argentine), 
while Argentina was suffering more from hyperinflation (i.e. In 1989, inflation in 
Argentina was over 3000%, as opposed to 21.26% in Egypt).24   
 
Officially, privatisation started in Egypt in 1991 when the government signed a letter of 
intent with the IMF in April 1991, by which Egypt agreed to abide by the recommended 
policies of the IMF’s Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP). 
However, the pace of privatisation was very slow at the beginning of the program. The 
first sale of SOEs under law 203 of 199125 was recorded in 1993. The Middle East 
conflict at that time (i.e. coalition against Iraq), in addition to foreign aids and debt 
relieves given to Egypt for its participation in coalition, reduced the pressure on the 
government to privatise and hence slow-started privatisation.26 In addition, the 
government’s concern about the social effects of privatisation, given the size of labour 
employed by SOEs in Egypt, had an effect on the pace of privatisation, as the government 
had to take measures of reforming and preparing SOEs for sale.27 The government took 
two years (i.e. 1991 – 1993) in preparing public opinion for, and finalising the legal 
framework of, privatisation. 
 
The popular technique of privatisation in Egypt during 1993 – 2000 was the sale of 
majority shares in the stock market, as indicated by table 4 in the appendix. In 1995, for 
example, all reported 8 transactions by the IFC were in the form of sale in the stock 
market.28 Selling to Anchor investors, especially to foreign anchor investors (i.e. FDI), was 
                                                 
20 The World Bank (1993), pp. 1-2, and Alexander and Corti (1993), p. 2. 
21 The World Bank (1993) indicates that total reduction in employment due to privatisation in early 1990s is “250,000 employee, 
leaving no more than about 60,000 public enterprise employees …” (WB, 1993, p. 15). 
22 Calculations are based on total labour and total population figures in 1990 obtained from the WDI (2002). 
23 Gerchunoff and Coloma (1993), pp. 251-2, and Pastor Jr. and Wise (1999), p. 487. See also table 3 in the appendix 
24 The World Bank classifies Argentina as severely indebted, while Egypt is classified as highly indebted [WDI (2002) CD-ROM]. 
25 Law 203 of 1991 is the regulating law for privatisation in Egypt. More details are in section 5. 
26 Sullivan (1992). 
27 Privatisation Coordination Support Unit – PCSU (2001). 
28 The IFC did not report any other privatisation technique in 1995. However, according to data obtained from IDSC website 
(www.idsc.gov.eg), in 1995 there were 3 companies sold to anchor investor. It is not clear, though, whether these anchor investors 
are local or foreign investors. 
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limited, with the majority of sales taking place in 1999. Most of FDI participation in the 
divestiture of SOEs was in the Manufacturing sector (Table 5). However, the government 
allowed FDI in the infrastructure sector via Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Build- 
Own- Operate- Transfer (BOOT) projects.29 These projects are regulated by separate laws; 
Law 229 of 1996 and law 3 of 1997, than that that regulates the privatisation of SOEs. 
 
The Egyptian privatisation programme has passed through three phases between 1993– 
2000:30 
 Phase One: From 1993 to 1995, the pace of privatisation was slow. Total number 
of companies sold during this period was 31 companies, with total proceeds of 
US$ 772.36 million. 
 Phase Two: From 1996 to 1998, the pace of privatisation accelerated. Total 
number of companies sold during this period was 85 companies, with total 
proceeds of US$ 2543.8 million. 
 Phase Three: From 1999 to 2000, the pace of privatisation slowed down again. Total number 
of companies sold during this period was 56 companies, with total proceeds of US$ 1164.88 
million. 
 
In terms of the sectoral distribution of privatisation in Egypt (figures 2 and 3), the 
manufacturing sector accounts for more than 50% of the privatisation proceeds and the 
number of transactions. Privatisation in the infrastructure and financial (especially 
Banking and Insurance) sectors is still limited31. Similarly, in the infrastructure sector, 
the government is reluctant to sell its SOEs, however, it has been allowing private sector 
to engage in new investments. For example, in the Telecommunication sector, Mobile 
networks are provided by two private companies; Mobinil and Vodafone (formerly known 
as Click). However, the competition within the Mobile network market is restricted32. On 
the other hand, Landline networks are totally controlled by SOE; Telecom Egypt. There 
were plans to offer 20% of its share in the stock market in late 2000; however, these 
plans were postponed.33 
 
By June 2001, the total number of companies privatised was 180 companies (Table 4), 
that is almost two-third of the companies offered under law 203 of 1991. The slow down 
of privatisation in the late 1990s can be attributed to the fact that the government has 
been focusing on selling profitable SOEs, and now it is left with loss-making or 
unprofitable SOEs. It was recommended that remaining companies, especially the loss-
makers, should be restructured in order to increase their performance and then offered 
for sale to anchor investors34, with more focus on attracting FDI.35 However, the 
programme reached to a halt and almost froze after 2001. In 2002, few privatisation 
transactions took place in the Banking sector, until the programme reached another halt 
in 2005. The government is now thinking of distributing free shares to citizens in 
strategic SOEs in the industries of iron, steel, cement, transportation and tourism.36 This 
proposed plan of the Egyptian government seems to be aiming to regain people’s support 
of privatisation and, in particular, of the government. However, voucher privatisation is 
                                                 
29 The government regards these operations as part of their privatisation program, as it opens a sector that has been dominated by 
SOEs to private participation. 
30 ‘Number of companies’ values are based on PCSU (2001), while ‘privatisation proceeds’ values are based on IFC privatisation 
database. 
31  Privatising the four public sector banks (Bank Misr, Bank of Cairo, Bank of Alexandria, and the National Bank of Egypt, which 
account for 60% of banking activity in Egypt (Tesche and Tohamy (1994), p. 11.), was not allowed. However, by 1999/2000, public 
banks were allowed to sell their shares in joint venture banks such as Cairo Barclays Bank. 
32 There have been talks of establishing a third Mobile Network Company for long time; however, no steps were taken until 2006. In 
2006, the Egyptian Telecommunication Ministry finally granted a license to the Emirates Company ‘Etaslat’. (Egyptian Chronicles, 
2007) 
33 PCSU (2001), p. 61. 
34  See figure 8 below. 
35 BETF (2000). 
36 Fraser, C. (2008); “Egypt to distribute free shares”, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7720677.stm [Accessed on 
18/11/2008] 
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not a method that allows FDI participation. This, again, casts further doubt on the 
government’s commitment to allow FDI to participate in the privatisation programme. 
Figure 2: Sectoral share of privatisation transactions in Egypt (1993 – 2000) 
Secoral share of number of privatisation 
transactions over 1993 - 2000
57%
10%
9%
17%
3% 4%
Manufacturing Financial Services
Other Primary Infrastructure
 
Source: calculated from IFC privatisation database. 
Figure 3: Sectoral share of privatisation proceeds in Egypt (1993 – 2000) 
Sectoral share of privatisation proceeds over 1993 
- 2000
59%
10%
10%
17%
2%
2%
Manufacturing Financial Services
Other Primary Infrastructure
 
Source: Calculated from IFC privatisation database. 
 
The Argentine government, unlike that of Egypt, started with privatising its largest and 
most difficult SOEs (e.g. ENTel and the airline company), most of which were 
concentrated in the infrastructure sector. The list of SOEs to be privatised covered 
telecommunications, airline, petroleum, natural gas, waterworks, electricity, railways, 
highways, shipping, hotel, insurance, and petrochemicals37. 
 
The main privatisation methods applied were the sale of shares in the new companies 
(e.g. the telecommunication company- ENtel) or via providing concession rights (e.g. 
highways, and railroads) for up to 99 years to operate these new companies38. The sale of 
shares was usually partial; at least 51% was sold to private companies, 39% was kept by 
the government for later sale via public offering in the stock market once the privatised 
                                                 
37 See the appendix for the full list of SOEs included in the Argentine privatisation programme. 
38 The World Bank (1993), p. 5 
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company operates successfully, and 10% to the employees.39 In some cases, the 
government opted for selling more than 51% of the shares to private companies, such as 
in the privatisation of ENTel where 60% of the shares were sold, 10% to the employees, 
and the 30% maintained by the government were later offered in the stock market once 
the operations of the newly privatised company proves successful and the stock market 
had become more developed.40 Table 6 in the appendix lists some of the major 
privatisations in Argentina that have taken place between 1989-2000. 
 
At the start of its privatisation programme, the Argentine government wanted to establish 
its commitment to privatisation and economic reform to the private investors; given its 
previous history of failed privatisation and stabilisation programmes41. Hence, a speedy 
sale of SOEs, and obtaining short-term results, was an important requirement to keep 
the interest of the investors, and the support of the public.42  
 
The Argentine programme started with 297 SOEs in 1989.43 By 1993, the Argentine 
government had privatised the majority of its SOEs.44 During 1989 – 1993, controlling 
interests in 57 SOEs were sold, concessions for operating 27 public service companies 
were granted, 9 joint venture agreements between YPF and private investors for primary 
oil fields were concluded, and 86 concession agreements for the exploitation of secondary 
oil fields were granted. The gross revenue of the program until 1993 amounted to $ 22 
billion ($ 9.1 billion in cash and $ 13 billion in Debt papers).45 By 2000, total proceeds of 
the Argentine privatisation programme amounted to $44.581 billion46.   
 
The sectoral distribution of Argentine privatisation is different than that of the Egyptian 
privatisation. Argentina started by privatising the large, and most difficult, public utility 
SOEs that were concentrated in the infrastructure (e.g. telecommunication and 
electricity) and petroleum sector. These sectors usually yield the highest proceeds (Sader, 
1993). In Egypt, on the other hand, the utilities and petroleum are organised as 
economic authorities, which were not included in the privatisation programme. Rather, 
the Egyptian programme included 314 non-financial companies that were concentrated 
in sectors such as manufacturing, construction, tourism, and food. 
 
Figure 4 indicates that in Argentina, in terms of the number of privatisations over 1988-
2000, infrastructure sector accounted for 63% of total privatisation, followed by the 
energy sector, which accounted for 20% of total privatisations. In Egypt, on the other 
hand, over 1993-2000, the infrastructure sector accounted for only 4% of total 
privatisations, while the manufacturing sector accounted for the majority of 
privatisations; 57% (figure 2).  
 
In terms of privatisation proceeds, the majority of the proceeds were generated by 
infrastructure and energy privatisation over 1988-2000. Figure 5, indicates that 50% of 
total proceeds are generated from the energy sector47, while 39% are generated from the 
infrastructure sector. In Egypt, on the other hand, infrastructure privatisation accounted 
for only 2%, while the manufacturing privatisation accounted for the majority; 59%, of 
total proceeds during 1993-2000 (figure 3). 
 
 
                                                 
39 The World Bank (1993), p. 6-7, and Harteneck and McMahon (1996), p. 75. 
40 Gerchunoff and Coloma (1993), p. 259, and p. 297. 
41 For more details on previous privatisation attempts and stabilisation policies prior to 1989 in Argentina, see Epstein 
(1987). 
42 World Bank (1993) 
43 Alexander and Corti (1993), p.1 
44 The World Bank (1993), p. vi and p.24. 
45 Harteneck and McMahon (1996), p. 67 and p. 71. 
46 Calculated from IFC privatisation database. 
47 The IFC classifies the petroleum sector under the Energy sector. 
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Figure 4: Sectoral share of Privatisation Transactions in Argentina (1988-2000) 
Number of privatisation transactions by sector (1988-2000)
63%
20%
7%
4% 3%
2%
1%
Infrastructure Energy Manufacturing Financial Services Other Primary
 
Source: IFC privatisation database. 
Figure 5: Sectoral share of Privatisation Proceeds in Argentina (1988-2000) 
Privatisation Proceeds by Sector (1988 - 2000)
Infrastructure
39%
Energy
50%
Manufacturing
1%
Financial
3% Services
7%
Other
0%
Primary
0%
Infrastructure Energy Manufacturing Financial Services Other Primary
 
Source: IFC privatisation Database. 
 
The above comparison indicates that the Egyptian privatisation programme is larger than 
that of Argentina in terms of the number of companies included in the programme. 
However, the composition of the privatisation programme in each country in terms of the 
type of SOEs included was different. Egypt offered 314 non-financial SOEs- most of 
which were in the manufacturing sector- with 1.1 million workers48, while Argentina 
offered 260 companies in the non financial sector- most of which were in the 
infrastructure sector- and 37 companies in the financial sector, with 310,000 workers.  
 
The Argentine programme, however, is larger than the Egyptian programme in terms of 
privatisation proceeds received. By 2000, total proceeds of the Argentine programme 
were $ 44.581 billion, while in Egypt total proceeds amounted to $ 4.481 billion49. Within 
the first five years of the start of the programme in Argentina (i.e. 1989-1993), the 
government had privatised the majority of its SOEs. During this period, 106 transactions 
were recorded, which accounted for 2/3 of total transactions recorded over 1988-2000 
                                                 
48 Brindle (1993); and Ayubi (1994). 
49 Calculated from the IFC privatisation database in constant prices. 
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(figure 7).  Revenue generated within the first five years amounted to $ 22 billion. While 
in Egypt, within the first five years of the programme (i.e. 1991-1995), only 31 companies 
(out of 314) were sold (figure 7) with $ 772.36 million.50 While it only took five years for 
the Argentine government to privatise 2/3 of its SOEs, it took Egypt double the time to 
privatise 2/3 of its SOEs51.  
 
Figure 6: Privatisation Proceeds in Argentina and Egypt 
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Source: IFC Privatisation Database. 
Figure 7: Privatisation Transactions in Argentina and Egypt 
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Source: IFC Privatisation Database 
 
Given the shortage of domestic capital in the developing countries, FDI participation in 
privatisation was deemed essential to the completion of these programmes. When 
comparing between Egypt and Argentina in terms of the degree of FDI participation in 
their privatisations, it is found that Argentina received far more FDI than Egypt. While 
total foreign investment52 in Argentina’s privatisation during 1988-2000 was $ 15 
billion53, it was $ 0.920 billion in Egypt54. When Debt Equity Swaps (DES) is included, 
                                                 
50 PCSU (2001) 
51 PCSU (2001) indicates that during 1991-2001, Egypt had privatised 180 SOEs, which accounts for 2/3 of its programme.  
52 measured by foreign exchange earned on privatisation transaction. 
53 Calculated from the World Bank Privatisation Database. 
54 See table 5 in the appendix. Calculations are from the IFC privatisation database. 
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FDI in Argentina’s privatisation amounted to $27.887 billion; which represents 62.6% of 
total proceeds. In Egypt, FDI participation in the privatisation amounted to $1.090 
billion or 24.3% of total proceeds.55 The following two sections investigate whether the 
differences in institutions and regulations of privatisation and FDI in these two countries 
explain the differences in privatisation accomplishments and FDI participation. 
 
4. Institutional and Regulatory Frameworks of FDI in Egypt and 
Argentina: 
 
Before examining the institutional and regulatory frameworks of privatisation, it is worth 
examining the institutional and regulatory frameworks of investment in Egypt and 
Argentina, given that the development of these frameworks took separate paths, 
especially in the case of Egypt. In Argentina, total liberalisation of FDI regulations was 
concurrent to the economic reform and structural adjustment of the economy. So, when 
the government was developing its legal and regulatory framework of privatisation, it took 
into account the need for FDI participation and hence their laws were co-ordinated and 
their process was relatively transparent to the investor when compared to that in Egypt, 
as will be discussed later. In Egypt, on the other hand, the process of liberalising private 
investment, and FDI in particular, was gradual and started long time before the 
government engaged in privatisation. Table 7 in the appendix presents an overview and 
comparison of the investment laws in Egypt. 
 
The liberalisation of private investment in Egypt started in the 1970s. The commitment 
of the government to attract and encourage private investment (i.e. domestic, Arab, and 
or foreign) was captured by the enactment of Law 43 in 1974, which was later amended 
by Law 32 of 1977. The provisions of this law regulated the activities of foreign direct 
investment (both Arab and non-Arab investment) and the establishment of free zone 
areas in Egypt. Also, under this law public enterprises could enter in joint ventures with 
foreign investors, and the created joint ventures were considered as part of the private 
sector. Thus, law 43 is regarded by some to be the first attempt to allow the public sector 
to privatise its assets.56 Law 43 of 1974, and its amendments in law 32 of 1977, included 
several incentives to foreign investors in terms of its sectoral coverage, foreign ownership 
and tax incentives. In addition, it included provisions that guarantee against 
nationalisation and expropriation. However, it contained some restrictions on capital 
repatriation, and the extent of foreign ownership. In addition, joint ventures between 
public enterprises and private investors, though were considered part of the private 
sector, were still restricted in terms of their ability to set prices and lay off workers57. In 
other words, some public sector practices were still being applied in these private sector 
companies. Though law 43 was directed to encourage private investment in general, the 
political inclination was to give more advantages to Arab investment.58  
 
In 1981, slightly more liberalisation of private investment regulations was incorporated 
in Law 159 of 1981 (also known as the ‘Companies law’). The provisions of this law apply 
to both local and foreign private investors. The law regulates the rules and procedures of 
setting up private companies and it includes similar guarantees against nationalisation 
and expropriation, provisions for capital repatriation, and more tax incentives. However, 
it has also several restrictions such as minimum requirements for employment of 
Egyptian workers and their wages. In addition, though foreigners may have 100% 
ownership of their projects, they are not allowed to own the land on which their projects 
are built. The implementation of this law is supervised by the General Organisation for 
                                                 
55 Calculations are based on current prices from the World Bank privatisation database. 
56 Pripstein Posusney (1992), p.92. 
57 Ott (1991), p. 197. 
58 Pripstein Posusney (1992), p. 83. 
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Industrialisation (GOFI). Some still regard the provisions of law 159 to be in favour of 
Arab investment over non-Arab investment.59 
 
In 1989, the Egyptian government passed a ‘unified investment law’; Law 230 of 1989, 
by which law 43 of 1974 was cancelled and its incentives were combined with the 
incentives provided by the ‘new communities’ law (law 59 of 1977)60. The provisions of 
this law are directed to both local and foreign investors, and it aims at encouraging 
private investment in new communities and industrial zones by giving more incentives to 
projects undertaken in these areas than those built in major cities or the old valley61. 
Among the new incentives provided by this law is the freedom of private companies to set 
their own prices. Also, the law provided for reducing the time it takes the investment 
authority (GOFI) to give preliminary approvals on new projects to two weeks. However, 
the law also provided discretionary power to the prime minister and the minister of 
industry that allows them to interfere in a company’s pricing and profit policies, and 
required that companies allocate at least 10% of the profits to workers.62 
 
In 1997, more privileges to foreign investors were provided under Law 8 of 1997 (the 
investment law). The most distinguished feature of this law is that the law explicitly 
states that foreign investment is to be treated as the same as national investment, and in 
this sense, foreign investors receive equal incentives as local investors. The investment 
law of 1997 overcome many of the restrictions imposed by previous laws. There are no 
restrictions on foreign ownership of projects or land (except agriculture land), no 
restrictions on capital repatriation, and no minimum requirements regarding Egyptian 
employment or wages. The law also provided 16 activities in which any new investment is 
guaranteed an automatic approval and registration of the new company will not take 
more than one week63. The implementing authority is the General Authority for Foreign 
Investment and Free Trade Zones (GAFI).  
 
Any other investment activity that is not covered by the investment law no. 8 of 1997 will 
be automatically subject to law 159 of 1981 and its restrictions. Thus, it is more 
beneficial for foreign investors to invest in law 8 activities and benefit from its provisions, 
and the majority of foreign companies choose to register under this law64. These two 
laws, however, are not the only laws that regulate FDI in Egypt. FDI in the petroleum 
sector is regulated by concession agreements between the investors and the Egyptian 
General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC). Foreign investment in the local insurance 
market is regulated by Law 91 of 1995. Build-Operate-Transfer projects for highways and 
airports are regulated by law 229 of 1996 and law 3 of 1997. However, the companies 
law and the investment laws, and their respective regulatory bodies; GOFI and GAFI, are 
considered the main laws that regulates the majority of FDI projects in Egypt. 
 
Although the investment authority announced that preliminary approvals for potential 
investment projects under law 159 of 1981 (i.e. the companies law) would be issued 
within two weeks from submission of the application, in reality, private investors had to 
go through a lot of bureaucracy. The private investor must submit a detailed feasibility 
study to two institutions: the Ministry of Economy and the GOFI; where each institution 
formulates a committee to assess the application. The committee of the Ministry of 
Economy includes representatives from every key government organisation and holding 
companies. The interest of this committee is to ensure that the proposed activity of the 
new company is not already covered by existing production (mainly by SOEs). A 
                                                 
59 Ott (1991), p. 190. 
60 The ‘new communities’ law is the law regulating the establishment of new communities and industrial cities such as Sadat city and 
6th of October city. 
61 ‘Old Valley’ refers to cities situated around the Nile Valley such as Cairo and Giza. 
62 Sherif and Soos (1992), p. 69. 
63 See table 7 in the appendix for details of these 16 investment activities. 
64 UNCTAD (1999a), p. 20. 
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unanimous approval by all members is required if the Ministry of Economy is to approve 
the project. On the other hand, GOFI committee is formulated of 14 members; each of 
them has a separate set of guidelines upon which the established of the company is 
approved or disapproved (Sherif and Soos, 1992, p. 70). With such complicated 
procedures, many obstacles can prevent a new private company to be established under 
this law. Disapproval from one committee member of the Ministry of Economy is enough 
to stop a private company from being established. As such, high degree of corruption, in 
addition to lack of transparency, exists in Egypt.65 
 
On the other hand, FDI in the 16 activities listed by the investment law 8 of 1997 (i.e. the 
investment law) are guaranteed automatic approval by the designated regulatory agency; 
GAFI. The private investor is not required to submit detailed feasibility studies; only a 
two-page notification form with main information about the project is sufficient to obtain 
an automatic approval. In addition, the registration of the company with GAFI is 
completed within one week of the submission (UNCTAD, 1999a, p. 23). In addition, 
companies established under law 8 of 1997 enjoy some provisions that are not provided 
by law 159 of 1981; such as no restrictions on foreign ownership of land and/or property 
of the company, no restrictions of foreign equity, no restrictions of capital repatriation, 
no minimum requirements regarding employment, wages, and distribution of profits, and 
no control on pricing policies.  
 
A company that is established under the investment law, however, may still be required 
to deal with GOFI in later stages of establishment as seen in figure 8. Hence, even 
though, according to a survey undertaken by the UNCTAD and the Economic Research 
Forum (ERF) in Egypt, law 8 of 1997 is seen by executives of TNC affiliates as “a drastic 
improvement of the business climate”66, FDI in Egypt still faces some obstacles, such as 
number of other governmental agencies’ authorisations that is required to establish a 
business (e.g. buying land, building permits, installing utilities … etc.) 
 
Another major obstacle to FDI in Egypt is the complication of the tax system and the way 
it is implemented. In addition, any tax disputes take years till they get resolved due to 
the poor quality of the judicial system in Egypt.67 Figure 9 depicts the main obstacles to 
FDI inflows to Egypt that were identified by the UNCTAD. According to the UNCTAD 
(1999a), Egyptian business climate still have room for improvement, as 13 out of 16 
factors have an average score above three. 
 
In Argentina, on the other hand, FDI has existed since the 1880s; mainly in the 
infrastructure sector. Telecommunications were provided by a US-based company, while 
French and British companies dominated the railroad services.68  However, the levels of 
FDI remained insignificant until the 1990s (Urbiztondo, 1998). This is due to the 
prevailing hostile and protectionist policies that emerged after the World War II, mainly 
1946, when the government started in nationalisation and establishing its public sector 
(World Bank, 1993). FDI inflows to Argentina, however, increased sharply in the 1990s. 
This increase was partly attributed to the launch of the privatisation programme in 
Argentina, and to the deregulations undertaken in 1991 (Rojo and Hoberman, 1994).  
 
                                                 
65 According to a study carried out by the Information and Decision Support Centre of the Cabinet, the Transparency index for Egypt 
is low (i.e. 4.9) compared to the transparency indices of other countries such as Turkey, Israel, and Jordan that are more than 5 
[IDSC, 2004b, p.22]. Furthermore, according to transparency international’s corruption perception index (CPI), corruption in Egypt, 
though has been decreasing over the years, is still considered relatively high (1998 CPI score of 2.9) compared to other countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) such as Tunisia (1998 CPI score of 5) [Transparency International Website: 
www.transparency.org . The lower the score the more corruption is perceived. The maximum score is 10 and it reflects no corruption 
perceived.] 
66 UNCTAD (1999a), p. 19. 
67 The Egyptian Judicial system is very slow; court cases can take up to 10 years, and they are subject to automatic appeal 
(UNCTAD, 1999a). 
68 Gerchunoff and Coloma (1993), The World Bank (1993). 
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Figure 8: Business Establishment in Egypt in 1998 
 
Source: UNCTAD (1999a), p. 43. 
 
Figure 9: FDI obstacles in Egypt 
 
Source: UNCTAD (1999a), p. 24, based on a survey undertaken by UNCTAD/ERF in 1998. 
                 Note: The higher the score, the stronger the obstacle. 
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Prior to 1991, FDI was prohibited to participate in ‘strategic sectors’ such as defence, 
telecommunications, oil, mining, electricity, gas, etc.69 Foreign investors were required to 
register in the National Registry of Foreign Investment, and in cases where the 
investment exceeded certain amounts, permission from the Executive Branch or the 
Ministry of Economy was required. In addition, there was a waiting period of 3 years 
before any repatriation of profits can take place. Even then, a prior permission was 
needed to repatriate the profits. The Central Bank had to be notified of any loans 
requested by foreigners from the local market70 In the 1980s, the Radical government 
managed to partially liberate FDI in the Petroleum sector. In 1985, the ‘Houston Plan’ 
allowed foreign companies- via concessions- the exploitation of Argentina’s secondary 
areas. (WIR, 1992, p. 27) 
 
In 1991, the reform of the Foreign Investment Law abolished all the above restrictions 
on, and further liberalised, FDI:71 
- Foreign investors are no longer required to register in the National Registry of Foreign 
Investment. Registration is optional and for statistical purposes only. 
- There is no waiting period for repatriation of profits nor is permission required to 
engage in such repatriation. In addition, taxes on repatriated profits are eliminated. 
- Investors are granted full access to local credit markets and the requirement of 
notifying the Central Bank was cancelled.  
- Obtaining prior permission for entering in technology transfer agreements is no 
longer needed.  
- Sector restrictions are removed. FDI is allowed in all sectors (except in media and 
Defence-related industries) without any prior permission.  
 
The deregulation of FDI has allowed it, in addition of participating in the privatisation of 
public utilities, to enter sectors that were restricted to both foreign and domestic 
investors; such as Mining. As a result, important foreign investments; which helped in 
the development of some underdeveloped areas72, took place.  FDI in the Mining sector 
represented 10% of total FDI during 1996.73 The Insurance sector is another sector that 
has been partially liberalised and opened up to FDI. Foreigners are allowed to own and 
establish Argentine companies, but direct insurance contracts with foreign companies 
that are based outside Argentina is still limited.74     
 
Other deregulations that have affected FDI includes the cancellation of the local content 
law known by “Compre Argentino” or “Buy Argentine”, which required all SOEs to buy 
their inputs from local sources, as long as they are available in the country.75 The 
abolishing of this law meant that foreign investors who buy privatised companies are not 
bound with ‘minimum local content’ requirements.   
 
The Argentine Regulatory framework for FDI is relatively more liberalised than that of 
Egypt. In Egypt similar incentives were given under the Investment Law (Law 8 of 1997) 
such as removing the restrictions on profit repatriation, and allowing 100% foreign 
ownership. However, while in Argentina FDI is regulated by one law (i.e. the Law of 
Foreign Investment); foreign investment in Egypt is regulated by several laws- depending 
on the sector- and is still required to register with the relevant regulatory body, as 
indicated earlier. Moreover, investments in the petroleum, insurance, and highways and 
                                                 
69 Shaikh et al. (1996), p. 26 
70 Pastor Jr. and Wise (1999) and Rojo and Hoberman (1994). 
71 Harteneck and McMahon (1996), Pastor Jr. and Wise (1999), WIR (1992), and Rojo and Hoberman (1994) 
72 A joint venture between Anglo-American (a South African gold mining company) and Perez Compac (an Argentine corporation) 
was established to invest $17 million in gold mining in Santa Cruz; one of the least developed areas in Argentina (Rojo and 
Hoberman, 1994). 
73 Urbiztondo (1998), p. 462. 
74 Rojo and Hoberman (1994), p. 173. 
75 Shaikh et al. (1996), p. 26 
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airports sectors are regulated by special laws.76 The difference in regulatory frameworks 
between Argentina and Egypt is another factor explaining why FDI inflows to Argentina 
are more than those to Egypt. 
 
5. Institutional and Regulatory Frameworks of Privatisation:  
 
Egypt and Argentina had similar macroeconomic problems that motivated them to 
engage in privatisation. However, when it came to executing the programme, the 
Argentine government was aggressive and speedy in selling its SOEs, while the Egyptian 
government took its time and spent the first two years in restructuring its SOEs and 
improving their performances. Furthermore, what helped the Argentine government to 
apply a speedy privatisation was the existence of strong and unanimous political and 
public support to privatisation In Egypt, on the other hand, there has been constantly a 
division among the government officials regarding which SOEs to be privatised and by 
what method, and that was partly influenced by personal objectives and a desire to keep 
office. There has been also strong opposition from labour unions and the public to 
privatisation in some instances for the fear of job losses. Such fears were inevitable and 
justified given that SOEs were over hiring and that the government was not transparent 
in terms of how the process is carried out or how decisions are taken to privatise a SOE. 
Hence, the lack of unanimous political and public support to privatisation, in addition to 
other factors, can explain the slow pace of privatisation in Egypt.   
 
The legal framework of privatisation in Egypt is provided by Law 203 of 1991. Under this 
law, public enterprises were re-organised as affiliated companies to 27 holding 
companies. Later, in 1993 the holding companies were re-organised into 17 companies, 
then in 2001, into 14 companies.77 The continuous restructuring and re-organisation of 
holding and affiliated companies slowed down the decision making process and the 
execution of privatisation since each new management would have a different agenda for 
the privatisation of its affiliated companies. It was also confusing to potential investors, 
given the complicated legal framework governing the process, and the lengthy process of 
establishing new business as will be mentioned below. 
 
Law 203 of 1991 included 314 non-financial public enterprises with a reported book 
value between L.E. 72 and 77 billion and 1.1 million workers.78  Under this law, the 
holding companies are no longer subject to public sector laws or granted any 
governmental privileges. Holding companies (HCs) and their affiliates (AFs) are to operate 
as commercial enterprises, set their own production, management, marketing, financial, 
pricing and profit policies. They are no longer in receipt of subsidies from the 
government, but they are allowed to borrow from commercial banks at same rates offered 
to private companies. Matters relating to employment, however, are still relatively tight79. 
The management of affiliated companies are responsible for daily activities, while the 
board of directors of the holding company evaluates the performance of the affiliated 
companies and provides advice on possible improvements. Holding companies have the 
responsibility of ensuring profitability to their shareholders. The HC is also responsible 
for appointing half of the board of directors of the AF, while the other half is elected by 
the employees80. According to Tesche and Tohamy (1994), one of the disadvantages of 
Law 203 is that “the heads of HCs are government ministers”81, which still reflects 
                                                 
76 Foreign investment in the petroleum sector is governed by concession agreements between the investors and the Egyptian General 
Petroleum Corporation (EGPC). Foreign investment in the local insurance market is regulated by Law 91 of 1995. Build-Operate-
Transfer projects for highways and airports are regulated by law 229 of 1996 and law 3 of 1997. 
77 Omran (2004); and Brindle (1993). 
78 Brindle (1993); and Ayubi (1994). 
79 BETF (2000). 
80 Tesche and Tohamy (1994), p. 14. 
81 Ibid, p. 14. 
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political influence on the activities of Law 203 companies, and hence government 
intervention in the economic activity. 
 
The decision on which affiliated company to be privatised, by what method, and at what 
time is the responsibility of the Holding companies. Figure 8 depicts how a decision of 
which privatisation method to use is reached. Depending on the method of privatisation 
used, unanimous approval from the ‘Ministerial Privatisation Committee’ may be 
required, such as in the case of selling to an anchor investor).82 Holding companies are 
assisted by other agencies and/or governmental bodies. The Public Enterprise Office 
(PEO); an independent body affiliated to the Ministry of Public Enterprise Sector was set 
up in 1991 to provide technical advise on issues related to the preparation of an SOE for 
privatisation, or the preparation of attractive packages of an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO).83 Other technical support is received via technical advisory projects financed by 
international donors84, such as USAID and EU.85 The USAID acts as a long-term 
monitoring adviser, and for some time, it acted as a promoter for SOEs offered for 
privatisation to the international business. The World Bank has also supported the 
Egyptian privatisation program via extending Structural Adjustment Loans for developing 
infrastructure and establishing a ‘social equity fund’ to help people affected by 
privatisation (e.g. retraining laid-off labour, offering training programmes for unemployed 
graduates, providing loans to small businesses).86  
 
The complication of privatisation procedures depend on the technique used. For 
example, if an affiliated company is to lease part of its assets, then a decision can be 
made by the board of directors of the affiliated company. While if all assets and factories 
of an affiliated company are to be leased, then the decision is left to the board of 
directors of the Holding company.  
 
Perhaps the most complicated procedures are those concerning the sale of an SOE to an 
anchor investor. According to an interview published in PCSU (2001), with Dr. Mokhtar 
Khatab; Minister of Public enterprise sector at that time, if an affiliated company is 
considered for sale to an anchor investor, the following procedures are followed:87  
- An ‘extraordinary general assembly’ of the holding company is called for and an 
agreement needs to be reached about selling the affiliated company to an anchor 
investor. 
- A promoter is selected and information about the company is prepared. Potential 
buyers have to submit their offers within the deadline specified. 
- A committee is formed to receive and open the offers. 
- Another committee is formed to evaluate the offers and raise its recommendations 
to the board of directors of the HC. 
- The board of directors reviews the recommendations raised by the committee with 
the general assembly and a unanimous decision need to be reached. 
- The decision is then reviewed by the Ministerial Privatisation Committee (MPC), 
and a unanimous approval is needed if the sale to be complete.  
- Once the MPC provides its approval, the holding company starts preparing the 
contract and ownership are to be transferred.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 PCSU (2001). 
83 BETF (2000), p.12. 
84 For details on donor-funded agencies, see PCSU (2001), pp. 79 – 89. 
85 PCSU (2001), p. 18. 
86 Sullivan (1992), p. 30; Tesche and Tohamy (1994), p. 20; Kikeri (1998), p.421. 
87 PCSU (2001), p. 7. 
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Figure 8: Methods and determinants of privatisation and the type of investment involved in 
Egypt88 
 Does the SOE have potentials for profit-making? 
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investor is faced with some restrictions or requirements. For example, when the Nasr 
Bottling company and the Egyptian Bottling company were sold to Coca Cola 
International and Pepsi International, respectively, the agreement maintained that they 
“expand production, maintain present workforce, and to float 20% of equity on stock 
market … [and] offer 10% to workers within 2-3 years” (Tesche and Tohamy, 1994, p. 
17).  
 
SOEs offered for privatisation may be 100% or 51% owned by the state. These two types 
of SOEs are subject to Law 203 of 1991. The government has also offered its share in 
other companies, where it holds less than 51% of the equity, for privatisation. These 
companies are subject to investment laws no. 159 of 1981 and 230 of 1989.89 Once the 
state’s share in a ‘Law 203 company’ falls below 51%, this company becomes 
automatically subject to investment law no. 159 of 1981 (see figure 9). 
Figure 9: Regulatory framework of SOEs 
 
One major drawback in this regulatory framework is that it is unclear under which 
investment law will a fully privatised company operate. One may argue that, from a point 
of view of a potential foreign investor, this multiplicity of laws is a major deterrent for 
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been fully privatised and sold to a foreign investor. If a foreign investor buys majority 
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that participating in privatisation will not grant the foreign investor the privileges of 
investment law no. 8 of 199790, and hence it would be better for the investor to enter the 
market with a Greenfield investment. This may be considered one of the reasons limiting 
FDI participation in the privatisation program of Egypt. 
 
                                                 
89 Any JVs between the public sector and private sector that were created under law 43 of 1974 are not considered within the 
privatisation program (Ayubi, 1995, p. 11). 
90 Under Law no 8 of 1997, there are no explicit provisions that relate between foreign investment and privatised companies. In 
addition, with the way the incentives are formulated, one may conclude that it is applicable on Greenfield investment only . On the 
other hand, GAFI is the authority responsible for the promotion of FDI opportunities and implementing the provisions of Law no. 8 
of 1997. While it is the holding companies in coordination with the Public Enterprise Office (PEO), as discussed earlier, that 
negotiate and organise the privatisation of an SOE. Therefore, there is no co-ordinating, or dedicated, body that promotes both 
privatisation and Greenfield investment opportunities to the foreign investor.  
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Another weakness in the Egyptian privatisation programme is that it proceeded without 
the existence or development of regulatory bodies for post privatisation activities. The 
regulation of the Cement Industry is a prominent example of such weakness. The cement 
industry was dominated by more than a dozen of SOEs, with Torah Cement and Suez 
Cement constituting the market leaders in early 1990s. In 1999, the government started 
to privatise its SOEs in the Cement Industry. The government privatised seven of these 
SOEs that accounted for two-thirds of total cement production in the economy via selling 
controlling shares to multinationals. The market, however, did not have regulatory 
bodies that can ensure competition. When the government started privatising the cement 
industry, the only regulating body was the Cement Industry Committee (CIC), with the 
main role of controlling the cement prices in the domestic market. However, the CIC 
failed to prevent the formulation of anticompetitive behaviour and collusion, and cement 
prices kept increasing sharply. Although the government has been pushing for a 
legislation that restricts monopoly and promotes competition in the cement and steel 
industries since 1995, it took them at least 17 drafts and 10 years until the law was 
finally passed in 2005 and the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) was created in 
2006.91  
 
In other words, the privatisation programme in Egypt progressed without any regulatory 
agencies in place. And by the time it reached to a halt in 2005, the government was just 
starting to create regulatory bodies. This contradicts what the government announced at 
the beginning of its privatisation programme that the aim of privatisation is to encourage 
the private sector and increase competition in the economy. The fact that pre-
privatisation markets were still monopolistic and anticompetitive fuelled more anti-
privatisation feelings among the public as they viewed that privatisation has served only 
the interests of few local businessmen and was characterised with lack of transparency 
and corruption.  
 
Privatisation in Argentina, on the other hand, managed to avoid some of the institutional 
and regulatory weaknesses that characterised the Egyptian programme. As most of the 
national Argentine enterprises are natural monopolies, the Argentinean government 
attempted to ensure some degree of competition once privatisation took place by creating 
contestant markets via establishing regulatory agencies and breaking down the large 
SOEs into smaller business units. 
 
The natural monopoly nature of some SOEs meant that, even with the break-down of the 
SOEs into separate units, the newly privatised companies will still enjoy some 
monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages. The government realised that such advantages 
are necessary to attract private investors. This meant that the privatisation of public 
utilities would lead to allocative inefficiency. To compensate for the loss of allocative 
efficiency, the government had to ensure that there would be an increase in the 
productive efficiency and improvement in the quality of services provided. Hence, the 
bidding documents specifically asked that at least one of the buyers of a given SOE be an 
international operator/ company (such as in the case of the airline privatisation), and 
that they will be committed to investment plans and to improving the quality of the 
privatised product/service (Gerchunoff and Coloma, 1993; the World Bank, 1993). 
Hence, Argentina was more adamant and welcoming to FDI participation than Egypt.          
 
The government’s primary objectives from privatisation were: 
1- To achieve short-term financing for reducing the financial deficit and external debt 
of the state. 
2- To increase competition and improve the quality of public utility services. 
                                                 
91 Ghoneim, A. (2008), “Privatisation alone is not enough”, in Competition and Development: the power of competitive markets, the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC). http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12093951851Comp_Case2_e_Egypt.pdf 
[Accessed 24/5/2009] 
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To achieve short-term financing and debt reduction, the government had to apply a 
speedy privatisation process that entailed wasting no time on operationally improving the 
SOEs- unlike the case in Egypt - and for the first two privatisations (i.e. ENTel, and AA) 
there were no market regulation prior to privatisation (Gerchunoff and Coloma, 1993). 
These early privatisations constituted a learning experience for the government of 
Argentina. Since 1992, the government’s privatisation approach differed. For subsequent 
privatisations (such as Gas and Electricity that took place in 1992) regulatory agencies 
(i.e. ENERGAS and ENRE) had been already established in 1991. That is why later 
privatisations are generally considered better in terms of transparency and quality than 
early privatisations.92  
 
Establishing regulatory bodies and deregulating the Argentine markets started in 1991 
when President Carlos Menem issued the Deregulation Decree93 (Decree 2284/91) on 
October 31, 1991. The decree specified deregulatory actions for seven aspects of the 
economy: “the domestic marketing of goods and services, international trade (imports 
and exports), public regulatory entities and public administration, public budget and tax 
reform, the capital market, the social security system and the collective bargaining/ 
labour regime” (Rojo and Hoberman, 1994, p. 167).94  
 
The decree also laid the basic strategies that were to be used by the Undersecretariat of 
Deregulation in establishing regulatory agencies. Prior to the 1990s, Argentina had weak 
regulatory framework, independent regulatory entities did not exist, and the government 
lacked the essential experience to establish such independent regulatory agencies.95 The 
government realised that a successful economic liberalisation requires separating the 
regulatory bodies from political influences.96 With the help of the World Bank97, the 
government established four regulatory agencies in the main public utility sectors in 
which privatisation took place: 
1- The Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (CNT) for regulating the 
telecommunication sector;  
2- The Ente Nacional Regulador de Gas (ENERGAS) for regulating natural gas sector; 
3- The Ente Nacional Regulador de la Energía Eléctrica (ENRE) for regulating the 
Electricity sector; and 
4- The Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (ETOSS) for regulating the 
Waterworks (i.e. water and sewerage services) sector. 
 
Both CNT and ETOSS were created by presidential decrees (i.e. decree 1185 of 1990 and 
decree 999 of 1992; respectively98), while ENERGAS and ENRE were created by 
Congressional laws (i.e. law 24 076 and law 24 065; respectively99). These regulatory 
agencies were given administrative autonomy and their finances did not come from 
public sources, rather they raised their finances from the regulation fees paid by the 
regulated firms under their authority. The main responsibilities of these regulatory 
agencies were monitoring and reviewing prices, ensuring competitiveness, and/ or 
preventing anticompetitive practices.100  
 
                                                 
92 Shaikh et al. (1996), p. 18. 
93 In reforming the Argentine economy some economic reform decisions were taken by presidential decrees rather than by 
congressional laws. The Argentine government used decrees to ensure speed and credibility of application, and to overcome any 
potential opposition to the proposed action. (Rojo and Hoberman, 1994). 
94 For more details on deregulatory actions taken in each market, see Rojo and Hoberman (1994). 
95 World Bank (1993) and Shaikh et al. (1996) 
96 Urbiztondo (1998) 
97 For more details on the role of the World Bank and other international agencies in Argentina’s privatisation see: Alexander and 
Corti (1993), Shaikh et al. (1996) and The World Bank (1993) 
98 Mairal (1996), p.135 
99 Ibid, p. 135. 
100 For more details on the composition, responsibilities and decision making of the regulatory agencies in Argentina, see Urbiztondo 
(1998), pp. 468- 478. 
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Granting financial and administrative independence to the regulatory agencies, however, 
was not enough to ensure the objectivity of the regulatory system. To some extent, the 
regulatory bodies were susceptible to political influences or private firms’ agenda. The 
degree of influence depended on the number of firms being regulated under each agency. 
On one hand, CNT was more affected by lobbying activity as it was mainly regulating two 
private telecommunication firms (i.e. Telecom and Telefónica). On the other hand, ETOSS 
was influenced more by political factors as its members are from national and provincial 
governments, and it is regulating the activities of only one company.101 On the other end 
of the spectrum, ENERGAS and ENRE are less vulnerable to be affected by the agendas 
of their regulated firms or by the agenda of the governing party as they each regulate 
many firms (hence the diversity of their financing sources) and the appointment of their 
members needs Congressional approval. (Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999) 
 
In terms of the legal framework, the basic legal statute of privatisation in Argentina was 
put by two important laws that were passed by the Congress in 1989: The first is the 
State Reform Act (SRA) or law (23 696) and the Economic Emergency Act (EEA) or law (23 
697). The SRA empowered the President to appoint trustees for the SOEs to be 
privatised. A trustee was to be in charge of the SOE till it is being privatised. The trustee 
is accountable to the president only. Priority was given to structural and labour 
reorganisation rather than operational improvements. Operational improvements were 
left to the new owners, and hence the government did not waste time in first financially 
improving the SOE prior to selling it (as in the case of Egypt). The trustee ensured the 
implementation of the voluntary retirement programme102 and the break down of large 
public utility enterprises into smaller business units.  The SRA also put the Ministry of 
Economy in charge of privatisation, which in turn created a special division to deal with 
privatisation known by the Undersecretariat for Privatisation. 
 
The EEA, on the other hand, listed the companies to be privatised.103 The law also 
required the government to follow a set of privatisation methods and procedures in 
principal, such as selling 10% of the privatised SOE to the employees through the 
implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Programmes (ESOP)104. However, the law 
was not too rigid as it gave the government the authority to decide on the best 
privatisation strategy especially if the proposed strategies by the law proved to be 
inappropriate. The law also gave authority to the government to privatise any other 
companies that were not listed in the EEA subject to prior approval of the Congress.105   
 
The mostly used technique in privatising Argentina’s SOEs, whether via sale of shares or 
via concessions, was the two-envelop competitive bidding system. Each bidder was to 
submit two envelops: the first contained the technical offer, while the second contained 
the financial offer. The buyers were mostly consortia of foreign and local investors.106 
Since debt reduction was an important objective of the government, the bidding 
documents of the first privatisations specifically asked for the payment form to be partly 
in cash and partly in Argentine debt papers. Later, as the price of Argentina’s debt 
increased, the government bidding documents included a minimum cash equivalent that 
incorporated the value of debt (The World Bank, 1993). 
 
                                                 
101 ETOSS regulates the activity of Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN), which is a natural monopoly firm, providing waterworks 
for the greater Buenos Aires area. The firm has been privatised via concessions, and hence the privatised firm stayed as a natural 
monopoly, which gave more leverage to the private concessionaire to influence the decisions of the regulatory body ETOSS.  
102 Argentina had a generous severance payment scheme that allowed smooth application of privatisation without much resistance 
from the labour force. Severance benefits were estimated to be around $7200 per affected employee, which was more than what 
public employees were earning per year. For more information on the Argentine severance scheme, see Harteneck and McMahon 
(1996) and Alexander and Corti (1993) 
103 See the appendix for the list of Argentine SOEs to be privatised. 
104 Mairal (1996)  
105 Harteneck and McMahon (1996). 
106 The World Bank (1993), p. 6 
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Most privatisations followed the following sequences:107 
01- Parliamentary approval. 
02- Establishment of privatisation commissions for each SOE to be privatised. 
03- Preparation and approval of the regulatory framework. 
04- Contracting the services of technical, legal and financial consultants via 
competitive bidding. 
05- Reorganising the SOE for sale into separate business units. 
06- Restructuring labour within the SOE and implementing voluntary retirement 
schemes. 
07- Establishing the regulatory structure, whenever necessary. 
08- Preparation of bidding documents and transfer contracts. 
09- Pre-qualification of potential bidders. 
10- Issuance of tender documents. 
11- Receipt and evaluation of bides. 
12- Preliminary and final award. 
13- Final transfer of assets/ company. 
14- Selling the remaining state’s minority shares via public offering in the stock 
market. 
15- Implementation of employee stock ownership programmes (ESOPs). 
 
The institutional framework of privatisation in Argentina is a hybrid of centralised 
monitoring (by the Undersecretariat for Privatisation and the Congressional privatisation 
committee) and decentralised implementation (via different privatisation commissions). 
The responsibilities of the Undersecretariat for Privatisation are:108 
1- Monitoring and ensuring consistency and transparency in the privatisation 
process. 
2- Setting a timetable for privatisation and monitoring its application. 
3- Implementing and managing the Employee Stock Ownership Programme (ESOP) 
4- Ensuring the uniformity in the application of voluntary retiring schemes. 
 
The responsibility of planning and implementation of actual privatisations were left to the 
relevant state secretariat (i.e. secretariat of transport, secretariat of energy, secretariat of 
communication, etc.). Special privatisation commissions were formed of representatives 
from the Undersecretariat for Privatisation, the relevant state secretariat, the SOE 
management, auditing bodies, and sometimes representatives from the provincial or 
municipal governments if they partially own the SOE (such as in the case of the 
Waterworks Company). These commissions were to decide on the method of 
privatisation, prepare the offering documents, and implement the privatisation 
procedures. The manager of the privatisation commissions was to report to the head of 
the relevant state secretariat. The privatisation commissions had access to various pre-
qualified consulting firms that offered them various technical, legal, and financial 
assistances. Figure 10 illustrates the institutional framework of privatisation in 
Argentina. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Harteneck and McMahon (1996), p. 76, The World Bank (1993), pp. 3-4, and Alexander and Corti (1993), p. 4. 
108 Shaikh et al. (1996), p. 25, and Harteneck and McMahon (1996), p. 75. 
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Figure 10: Institutional Framework of Privatisation in 
Argentina
 
In general, the institutional framework of privatisation in Argentina is similar to that of 
Egypt. Egyptian SOEs were grouped in holding companies (HCs), each controlling a 
number of affiliated companies (AFs). It is the AFs (as opposed to the new business units 
in Argentina) that are offered for privatisation. However, the implementation procedures 
of privatisation in Argentina are simpler than those in Egypt. In Egypt, the decision of 
privatising an affiliated company goes through many committees, and finally it is 
reviewed by a Ministerial Committee. Such lengthy procedures slowed down the 
privatisation process in Egypt. Moreover, conflict of interests existed within the Egyptian 
institutional framework, as state ministers were sometimes the head of the holding 
company (which is responsible for deciding which affiliated company to be privatised), 
and members in the Ministerial privatisation committees. This means that there is no 
clear separation between the implementation and monitoring processes within the 
Egyptian institutional framework. Moreover, given that not all Ministers are pro-
privatisation109, personal political agendas were interfering with the decision making 
                                                 
109 Privatisation advocates, also referred to as ‘reformists’ were represented by Fouad Sultan, Minister of Tourism; Yousef Wali, 
Minister of Agriculture; and Atef Obeid, Minister of Cabinet Affairs (who became Minster of Public Enterprise Sector in 1996, then 
Prime Minister in Oct. 1999). They called for taking drastic moves towards immediate privatisation and economic reform. On the 
other hand, opposition of immediate privatisation, and also referred to as ‘gradualists’,  was led by Kamal El Ganzouri, Minister of 
Planning (who later became the Prime Minister between 1996 – 1999); and Muhammad Abdel Wahab, Minister of Industry 
(Sullivan, 1992, p. 25). 
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process, which slowed down the pace of privatisation in Egypt. In Argentina, on the other 
hand, the organisation of the newly business units to be privatised was the sole 
responsibility of the trustees, who were appointed by, and solely accountable to President 
Menem. Shaikh et al. (1996) argue that “Replacing the chief executive [of an SOE] with 
another individual with a clearer mandate for privatisation and less attachment to the 
status quo- itself a sign of government seriousness- will contribute to the pace of 
reform”110. The existence of independent trustees, political support by all government 
officials, and congressional support and monitoring ensured no conflict of interests 
within the institutional framework, and speedy application, of the Argentine privatisation 
programme.  
 
6. Lessons and Policy Implications: 
 
The comparison between Egypt and Argentina in terms of their institutional and 
regulatory frameworks of privatisation and FDI highlight some good practices and 
lessons: 
 
1- Strong and unanimous political and public support to the privatisation policy ensures 
that a programme is completed within its predetermined timeframe and without any 
interruptions. It reflects the country’s commitment to carry the announced programme 
and, hence, encourage investors, especially foreign investors, to participate in the 
programme and accelerating its pace. The lack of such support has led to the halt of the 
privatisation programme in Egypt. The letter of intent that was signed with the IMF 
expected that the Egyptian privatisation programme would be completed by 1997. Actual 
privatisation, however, started in 1993 and the majority of transactions took place 
between 1993 – 2000. The programme then froze between 2000 and 2002. Since 2002, 
few privatisation transactions took place in the Banking sector, until the programme 
reached another halt in 2005.  
 
2- Clear and simple regulations and procedures of privatisation facilitates the 
participation of FDI. In developing the regulatory framework of privatisation, 
governments need to be clear whether it targets FDI participation by clearly linking 
between the regulatory frameworks of privatisation to that of FDI. In Argentina, FDI 
participation in privatisation accounted for 63% of privatisation proceeds, while in Egypt 
it only accounted for 24% of privatisation proceeds. One may argue that the limited 
participation of FDI in the Egyptian programme was partly caused by the multiplicity of 
laws regulating FDI activities, the complication of business establishment steps and the 
involvement of at least two FDI regulatory agencies and the weakness of incorporating 
these regulatory FDI laws within the privatisation regulatory framework (as indicated by 
figure 9). In Argentina, on the other hand, FDI was fully liberalised in early 1990s, 
regulated by one law and one regulatory agency. Hence, the policy maker should make 
sure that the liberalisation of FDI goes hand in hand with the development of the 
regulatory framework of privatisation. Removing obstacles such as reducing the steps of 
establishing a foreign business, providing a one-stop-shop authority for FDI and 
removing multiplicity in laws will encourage more FDI inflows to the country. 
 
3- Transparency ensures public support to, encourages foreign participation in, and fast 
application of privatisation. Furthermore, transparency leads to less corruption. Both 
Egypt and Argentina hold close scores according to Transparency International111 and 
more efforts are still needed to reduce the level of corruption in both countries.  
   In the case of Argentina, some (e.g. Saba and Manzetti, 1997) believed that the 
concentration of power given to the Executive Branch by the Congress (i.e. via the SRA 
                                                 
110 Shaikh et al. (1996), p. 17. 
111 See table 8 in the appendix. 
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and EEA) had increased the levels of corruption112 and allowed for favouritism in the 
privatisation of some SOEs, such as ENTEL (Saba and Manzetti, 1997). The Argentine 
government, however, strongly refused to accept the TI estimates and the allegations of 
corruption and claimed that the CPI does not reflect the efforts done to control and 
reduce corruption.113 Furthermore, some (e.g. Urbiztondo, 1998; Shaikh et al., 1996; and 
Alexander and Corti, 1993) argue that privatisation procedures and the regulations of the 
markets in Argentina were indeed transparent, and that the corruption levels were 
reduced114, especially with the constant scrutiny of the Argentinean media over every 
step taken by the government during the reform of the economy.  
   In Egypt, on the other hand, investors complain of lack of transparency and high levels 
of corruption (BETF, 2000). The process of privatising an SOE to an anchor investor, 
mentioned earlier, highlights the bureaucracy and lack of transparency in the whole 
process. It also increases the possibility of corruption given the requirement of 
unanimous approval of all committee members and that some of these members are both 
heads of holding companies and governmental ministries at the same time, which 
represents conflicts in interests and agendas. Furthermore, the lack of public support 
resulted from the lack of transparency and the public believe that the process is corrupt 
and that only few wealthy local businessmen were benefiting from the privatisation of the 
SOEs. The Egyptian privatisation programme has arrived to a complete halt in 2005, and 
the government is now thinking of distributing free shares to citizens in strategic SOEs in 
the industries of iron, steel, cement, transportation and tourism115 in an attempt of 
regaining the public support of the government and privatisation.  
 
4- Developing the regulatory bodies prior or during privatisation is essential to ensure 
competition and to augment the positive effects of privatisation on the economy.  A lack 
of market regulations may lead the newly privatised companies to behave as monopolists 
and hinder the process of economic reform and liberalisation. Moreover, it is important 
for the success of the privatisation and economic liberalisation that regulatory bodies are 
separated from any political influences. Both Egypt and Argentina had no or weak 
market regulations prior to privatisation. However, while Argentina engaged in the 
process of developing its regulatory bodies within two years of the start of its 
privatisation programme, Egypt proceeded with its privatisation programme without 
developing its regulatory framework, and only started doing so in 2005; 15 years after 
the government started privatisation and just as the programme reached to a halt. Such 
delay in developing market regulations led to the formulation of anticompetitive practices 
by some privatised firms (e.g. in the cement industry) in Egypt.  
 
5- Preparing and re-organising the SOEs for privatisation need to be achieved quickly, as 
it is another factor that reflects the government’s commitment to privatisation. It is also 
important to separate between the monitoring and implementing bodies of privatisation 
and ensure that the implementing bodies are strictly independent. This practice was 
evident in Argentina, where the government did not waste its time in operationally 
improving the SOEs prior to privatisation, and entrusted the re-organisation and the 
implementation of privatisation to a trustee, who is solely accountable to the president, 
and hence, not influenced by achieving his own personal agenda. In Egypt, however, the 
situation was different. The government wasted two years in operationally improving its 
newly restructured SOEs, and the managers of the newly formulated holding companies 
                                                 
112 One of the examples given to reflect the concentration of the power and susceptibility of the privatisation programme to 
corruption is the extensive use of decrees in privatising or regulating some sectors. During the first 3 years of President Menem’s 
rule, over 100 decrees were issued as compared to a total of 23 decrees over 1853- 1989. These decrees were issued to avoid any 
possible disapprovals within the Congress to a specific privatisations. These decrees were often unconstitutional, however, the 
Supreme Court approved them in the light of the sever economic conditions prevailing at the time. (Saba and Manzetti, 1997, p. 362)   
113 Transparency International (1997), Corruption Perception Index: Press Release, Berlin. www.transparency.de  
114 The government of Argentina has always denied any allegations of corruption, and quickly dismissed any Minister or Official 
who comes under suspicion. (Saba and Manzetti, 1997, p. 365) 
115 Fraser, C. (2008); “Egypt to distribute free shares”, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7720677.stm [Accessed 
on 18/11/2008] 
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were also governmental Ministers. This has slowed down the application of the 
privatisation and has given negative signals to potential investors about the government 
commitment to the programme and casted some doubts about the existence of personal 
objectives when it came to decide which affiliated company to be privatised and by which 
method. 
 
6- The participation of an independent media (i.e. media that is not affected by political 
agenda) can play an important role in ensuring transparency and reducing the 
opportunities of corruption. Getting full access to the information of privatising an SOE 
and monitoring the process of privatising this SOE ensures that the public will be kept 
informed, and hence gains the public’s support to the programme.  
 
7. Conclusion: 
 
This paper aimed at comparing between the Egyptian and Argentinean privatisation 
programmes and the extent of FDI participation in these programmes. Although both 
countries come from similar economic background and were motivated by similar 
macroeconomic problems to engage in privatisation, the Argentinean privatisation 
programme followed a fast pace and was completed within its expected timeframe, while 
the Egyptian programme progressed slowly and took longer than expected and, by 2005, 
it reached to a complete halt. Moreover, FDI participation in privatisation was larger in 
Argentina than in Egypt116 (i.e. 62.6% of total proceeds in Argentina compared to 24.3% 
of total proceeds in Egypt). This paper attempted to explain such differences between the 
two programmes based on the differences in the institutional and regulatory frameworks 
in each country.  The comparison between the two experiences yielded the following 
observations:  
 
1- FDI participation was larger in the Argentine privatisation than in the Egyptian 
privatisation because: 
   a: The government of Argentina explicitly demanded the participation of 
international operators in certain privatisations (e.g. Airlines). 
   b: Overall, the privatisation procedures were transparent (Shaikh et al., 1996) and 
the regulatory frameworks of privatisation and FDI were clearly defined and simple, 
while in Egypt the regulatory frameworks of privatisation and FDI are not clearly 
connected as in the case of Argentina. Foreign investors often complained of lack of 
transparency and corruption (BETF, 2000), in addition to the multiplicity of laws and 
complication of business establishment procedures in the Egyptian economy. 
   c: The privatisation of infrastructure sector is more attractive to foreign investors 
because of its economies of scale (Sader, 1993). As seen above, the majority of 
Argentine privatisation took place in the infrastructure sector, while in Egypt; it took 
place in the manufacturing sector. 
   d:  The smaller size of the Argentine public sector, compared to that in Egypt, 
implies that the private sector in Argentina was relatively more developed than that of 
Egypt at the time when privatisation took place. Hence, Argentina had the advantage 
of having relatively more advanced private firms with enough entrepreneurial 
experience, and financial and technical capacities to form consortia with international 
firms and participate significantly in, and accelerate, the privatisation programme117. 
 
2- Overall, privatisation in Argentina was applied faster than in Egypt because of: 
  a: the strong and unanimous support it received from all parties concerned (i.e. the 
president, the government officials, the consumers, and the workers). In Egypt, on the 
other hand, privatisation has been always a controversial issue and rarely receives 
unanimous support. There has always been some resistance to privatisation within 
                                                 
116 Privatisation in Argentina started in 1988, while in Egypt it started in 1993. 
117 The World Bank (1993), p. 22. 
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the different governments that came to power during the 1990s. Some officials 
(headed by ex-prime minister Kamal El Ganzouri) were resisting rapid privatisation. 
Others (headed by ex-prime minister Atef Abeid) were in favour of rapid application of 
privatisation.118 
  b: Furthermore, labour unions objected to many attempts of privatisation in Egypt 
(Ott, 1991). As a result, to avoid resistance from labour unions, the government 
sometimes specifically required that the buyer maintain the current workforce (e.g. 
the privatisation of Nasr Bottling Company and the Egyptian Bottling company to 
Coca Cola International and Pepsi International; respectively)119. In Argentina, on the 
other hand, generous Severance payments allowed for the reduction in labour force in 
the SOEs (e.g. employment in YPF was reduced from 51,000 in 1991 to 10,600 in 
1993, and employment in Railways was reduced from 156,000 to 95,000 prior the 
start of privatisation)120 without huge resistance from the labour force. Selling SOEs 
that are not over staffed is another attraction factor for FDI participation. 
 
In summary, the basic difference between the Argentine and Egyptian experiences with 
privatisation and FDI is that while in Argentina full liberalisation of FDI regulations was 
coordinated with the application of speedy privatisation programme, backed up with 
strong political and public commitment, in Egypt, FDI liberalisation developed gradually 
and separately from the application of a relatively cautious and conservative privatisation 
programme that lacked unanimous commitment from the various parties involved. Such 
different approaches had different effects on FDI inflows to the Argentinean and Egyptian 
economies in general121, and on FDI participation in their privatisation programmes, in 
particular.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 Sullivan (1992), p. 25. 
119 Tesche and Tohamy (1994), p. 7. 
120 Harteneck and McMahon (1996), p. 82 and Alexander and Corti (1993), p. 2. 
121 While Argentina enjoyed an overall steady increase in FDI during 1970-2000; with a particular surge since 
privatisation started in 1989, Egypt exhibited fluctuating FDI trends during the same period. (See figure A1 
in the appendix) 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Selected macroeconomic indicators for Egypt during 1960 - 2000 
Year 
GDP 
growth % 
p.a. 
GDPpc 
growth % 
p.a. 
Exports
%GDP 
Imports
%GDP Inflation 
% p.a. 
External 
Debt % 
GDP
a 
Exchange 
Rate
b 
1960 NA NA 19.52 20.09 NA NA 0.35 
1961 4.400376 2.16606 17.21 20.69 0.69 NA 0.35 
1962 6.856657 4.273142 17.16 23.03 -3.00 NA 0.40 
1963 9.055534 6.246758 18.66 25.21 0.75 NA 0.43 
1964 8.142304 5.29027 18.52 23.07 3.66 NA 0.43 
1965 9.225085 6.357968 17.54 21.35 14.84 NA 0.43 
1966 1.056637 -1.52883 16.95 19.90 9.04 NA 0.43 
1967 0.625937 -1.84465 14.65 17.76 0.70 NA 0.43 
1968 2.721421 0.327434 13.19 17.00 -1.67 NA 0.43 
1969 6.812552 4.464884 14.21 17.51 3.41 NA 0.43 
1970 5.598506 3.413375 14.18 18.75 3.76 38.77 0.43 
1971 3.440911 1.612906 13.79 18.89 3.14 40.36 0.43 
1972 2.028897 0.226714 13.35 19.13 2.10 36.19 0.43 
1973 0.705251 -1.12199 13.98 19.16 5.11 34.72 0.398 
1974 2.485497 0.539727 20.51 37.24 10.02 34.48 0.391 
1975 8.939176 6.753037 20.18 41.28 9.67 63.33 0.391 
1976 14.62725 12.18057 22.27 34.00 10.32 68.77 0.391 
1977 12.83696 10.26716 22.48 33.20 12.73 105.68 0.391 
1978 5.779704 3.249184 21.75 37.02 11.08 102.22 0.391 
1979 6.038857 3.430312 29.73 48.34 9.90 103.12 0.70 
1980 10.01134 7.266241 30.52 42.87 20.66 110.18 0.70 
1981 3.756081 1.131462 33.37 48.81 10.32 112.09 0.70 
1982 9.907166 7.098723 27.03 41.93 14.82 118.89 0.70 
1983 7.401136 4.645538 25.48 36.43 16.08 117.79 0.70 
1984 6.091523 3.374819 22.35 35.81 17.04 114.01 0.70 
1985 6.602048 3.894057 19.91 32.04 12.11 116.29 0.70 
1986 2.646573 0.09667 15.73 25.59 23.86 122.35 0.70 
1987 2.519425 0.030258 12.56 22.77 19.69 128.16 0.70 
1988 5.300718 2.80321 17.32 35.16 17.66 123.01 0.70 
1989 4.972376 2.541658 17.89 32.35 21.26 111.74 0.867 
1990 5.701755 3.313619 20.05 32.71 16.76 73.53 1.55 
1991 1.078838 -1.13614 27.82 35.80 19.75 69.36 3.138 
1992 4.433497 2.216034 29.03 31.84 13.64 61.85 3.322 
1993 2.881339 0.766857 27.70 30.70 12.09 57.65 3.353 
1994 3.948012 1.882405 22.94 28.14 8.15 57.56 3.385 
1995 4.665233 2.656714 22.45 27.50 15.74 55.41 3.392 
1996 5.009634 3.074985 20.18 25.96 7.19 48.70 3.391 
1997 5.492355 3.494406 19.55 25.83 4.63 43.20 3.389 
1998 5.579399 3.584123 16.25 26.37 4.18 43.57 3.388 
1999 6.023651 4.013644 15.13 23.70 3.08 38.65 3.395 
2000 5.123736 3.142068 16.14 22.73 2.68 33.81 3.472 
Source: WDI CD-ROM (2002) 
a calculations are based on constant 1995 US$. 
b LCU per US$ 
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Table 2: Selected macroeconomic indicators for Argentina during 1960 - 2000 
Year 
GDP 
growth % 
p.a. 
GDPpc 
growth % 
p.a. 
Exports
%GDP 
Imports
%GDP Inflation 
% p.a. 
External 
Debt % 
GDP
a 
Exchange 
Rate
b 
1960 NA NA 7.60 7.60 NA NA NA 
1961 5.43 3.52 5.99 5.99 13.39 NA NA 
1962 -0.85 -2.46 4.69 9.38 28.32 NA 87.17E-13 
1963 -5.31 -6.72 7.89 7.89 23.90 NA 13.87E-12 
1964 10.13 8.57 5.56 5.56 22.20 NA 14.04E-12 
1965 10.57 9.05 6.23 4.15 28.63 NA 16.96E-12 
1966 -0.66 -2.02 6.65 4.99 31.91 NA 20.92E-12 
1967 3.19 1.76 7.50 5.00 29.20 NA 33.34E-12 
1968 4.82 3.32 6.48 5.40 16.21 NA 35.00E-12 
1969 9.68 8.06 6.40 6.40 7.57 NA 35.00E-12 
1970 3.05 1.46 5.60 4.74 13.59 18.39 37.92E-12 
1971 5.66 3.89 6.01 6.61 34.73 18.78 45.22E-12 
1972 1.63 -0.08 7.20 6.84 58.45 19.50 50.00E-12 
1973 2.81 1.09 7.61 5.71 61.25 13.75 50.00E-12 
1974 5.53 3.80 6.90 6.29 23.47 10.53 50.00E-12 
1975 -0.03 -1.64 5.82 5.98 182.93 14.73 36.58E-11 
1976 -2.02 -3.55 9.18 5.92 443.97 18.13 14.00E-10 
1977 6.93 5.32 9.62 7.33 176.00 20.16 40.76E-10 
1978 -4.51 -5.91 8.61 5.72 175.51 22.86 79.58E-10 
1979 10.22 8.60 6.51 6.33 159.51 30.25 13.17E-09 
1980 4.15 2.60 5.06 6.48 100.76 35.29 18.37E-09 
1981 -5.69 -7.11 6.92 7.37 104.48 45.32 44.03E-09 
1982 -4.96 -6.39 9.09 6.52 164.78 51.76 25.92E-08 
1983 3.88 2.31 9.15 5.84 343.81 44.16 10.53E-07 
1984 2.21 0.67 7.59 4.76 626.72 61.77 67.65E-07 
1985 -7.59 -8.97 11.74 6.27 672.18 57.62 60.18E-06 
1986 7.88 6.28 8.16 6.32 90.10 47.28 94.30E-06 
1987 2.91 1.41 7.87 7.58 131.33 52.61 21.44E-05 
1988 -2.56 -3.94 9.53 6.21 342.96 46.62 87.53E-05 
1989 -7.50 -8.76 13.06 6.58 3079.81 85.15 0.04 
1990 -2.40 -3.68 10.36 4.63 2313.96 44.03 0.49 
1991 12.67 11.19 7.68 6.08 171.67 34.47 0.95 
1992 11.94 10.46 6.60 8.31 24.90 29.87 0.99 
1993 5.91 4.51 6.96 9.32 10.61 27.34 1.00 
1994 5.84 4.43 7.56 10.60 4.18 29.19 1.00 
1995 -2.85 -4.14 9.70 10.07 3.38 38.29 1.00 
1996 5.53 4.17 10.46 11.05 0.16 40.94 1.00 
1997 8.11 6.74 10.56 12.72 0.53 43.85 1.00 
1998 3.85 2.55 10.41 12.90 0.92 47.35 1.00 
1999 -3.40 -4.60 9.80 11.49 -1.17 51.29 1.00 
2000 -0.52 -1.74 10.78 11.42 -0.94 51.30 1.00 
Source: WDI CD-ROM (2002) 
a calculations are based on constant 1995 US$. 
b LCU per US$ 
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Table 3: SOEs participation in GDP and Investment, 1984, percentagesa 
 Participation in GDP Participation in GDI 
World Average 
Industrialised Countries 
Developing Countries 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
America 
Argentina 
Egyptb 
9.4 
9.6 
8.6 
17.5 
8.0 
6.6 
6.6 
7.4 
40.0* 
13.4 
11.1 
27.0 
32.4 
27.7 
23.4 
22.5 
20.5 
n.a. 
Source: a- Data on all regions except Egypt is from Gerchunoff and Coloma (1993), p. 252 (based on IMF and Sindicatura 
de Empresas Publicas.  
b- Data on Egypt is from Aly (1992), p. 55. 
Notes: * represents the share in output over 1974 – 1986. 
 
Table 4: Privatisation transactions by technique between 1993 and 2000/2001 
Privatisation Technique No. of 
Companies/ 
production 
units 
privatised 
Sale Value 
in L.E. 
million 
Sale of majority or all shares through the stock market 
Sale of majority interest to an anchor investor 
Sale to Employee Shareholder Associations 
Sale of minority interests in companies 
Sale of production assets 
38 
26 
30 
16 
18 
5,651 
6,702 
870 
1,755 
839 
Sub-total 128 15,817 
Complete Sale of assets 
Lease of production units 
32 
20 
 
Total 180  
Source: PCSU (2001), p. 9. 
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Table 5: FDI participation in the Egyptian Privatisation Programme (1993 – 2000) 
Percentage Sold Year Sectora Affiliated company Buyer 
Private 
sector 
ESA 
Value 
(US$ 
million)a 
Foreign 
Exchangea 
(US$ 
million) 
1993a 
 
Tourism 
 
Crocodile Tourist Project Co. (Jolie 
Ville Luxor) 
Foreign Investors n.a. n.a. 0.5 0.5 
1994 
 
Food and 
Beverage 
 
,, 
 
 
Manufacturing 
Egyptian Bottling Co. 
 
 
El Nasr Bottling Co. 
 
 
El Nasr Boilers 
Pepsi International + Local investor 
 
 
Coca Cola International + Arab 
Investor 
 
Babcock & Wilcocks International 
90% 
 
 
90% 
 
 
100% 
10% 
 
 
10% 
 
 
0% 
46.1 
 
 
95.1 
 
 
17.1 
46.1 
 
 
95.1 
 
 
17.1 
1996/ 
1997b 
F&B Al Ahram Beveragesb Consortium Local + International 
Luxor group + Danbrew  
 
90% 10% 68.0 .. 
1998a Tourism San Stefano Hotelc Consortium led by Prince Al Waleed 
bin Talal (Saudi Arabia) 
n.a.  79.0 79.0 
1999 Manufacturing 
 
n.i. 
 
Manufacturing 
 
,, 
 
Banking 
Beni Suef Cement 
 
Delta for Sandy Bricks 
 
Assiut Cement 
 
Alexandria Portland Cement 
 
Cairo Barclays Banka 
Lafarge (France) + [Titan (Greece)] a 
 
Bellina (Greece) 
 
Cemex (Mexico) 
 
Blue Circle (U.K.) 
 
Barclays Bank (U.K.) 
76% 
 
90% 
 
77% 
 
90% 
 
11% 
5% 
 
10% 
 
10% 
 
10% 
 
n.a. 
150.0 
 
n.i. 
 
414.5 
 
178.0 
 
4.0 
150.0 
 
n.i. 
 
414.5 
 
178.0 
 
4.0 
2000 Manufacturing 
 
,, 
Beni Suef Cementd 
 
Amriah Cement 
Lafarge (France) 
 
Simpor (Portugal) 
19% 
 
29% 
0% 
 
0% 
n.i. 
 
125.0 
n.i. 
 
n.a. 
Source: Data compiled from PEO (until 31/3/2000) and IFC privatisation database. 
Notes: a = only reported in IFC database.  b = conflict between IFC and PEO. IFC report it as local investment in 1997.   
           c = The San Stefano deal faced a lot of troubles and was blocked many times. The sale was finalised in 1998. 
           d = Beni Suef Cement Co. was sold over two years; 1999 and 2000. Therefore, it is counted as one transaction. 
n.a. = not available   n.i. = not included in the IFC database    
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Table 6: Selected Major Privatisations in Argentina (1989-2000) 
 Proceeds ($ bil.) Company/ 
Sector 
Structure/units Year  Percentage and Method 
Cash Debt 
FX in 
$ Bil. 
Buyers 
1990 60% - competitive bidding 0.1 2.3 1.80 Telecom Argentina, S.A. 
(Northern Area) 
1992 30% - IPO 1.2 - - 
STET/ France Consortium  
1990 60% - competitive bidding 0.114 2.7 2.03 
ENTel 
Telefónica Argentina, 
S.A. (Southern Area) 
1991 30% - IPO 0.830 - 0.364 
Telefónica Español 
Consortium 
AA  1989-1992 57% - Competitive bidding 0.260 1.61 1.30 Iberia Airline Consortium  
Petroleum YPF’s drilling areas and 
distillation facilities 
1990 – 1999 Various 21.563 - 18.75 Various foreign and local 
buyers 
Electricity 
/ 
Power Utilities 
SEGBA for Greater 
Buenos Aires and Agua y 
Energía. Restructured 
into new business units 
covering, power plants, 
distribution and 
transmission. 
1992 – 1998 Various 3.295 1.932 3.649 Various foreign and local 
buyers 
Natural Gas Restructured into 2 
regional gas 
transportation and 8 
regional distribution 
companies. 
1992, 1994, 
1998 
Various 1.031 1.541 1.430 Various foreign and local 
buyers 
Obras Sanitarias de la 
Nación 
1992 30 year concession - - - Foreign and local investors 
Obras Sanitarias 
Mendoza 
1998 95-year concession (70%) 
 
0.133 - 0.133 French/American/Italian 
Consortium 
Waterworks 
Aguas del Gran Buenos 
Aires, S.A. 
2000 Concession (BOT) 0.120 - n.a. n.a. 
Banks/Finance 6 banks/ financial 
entities were privatised 
between 1992 – 1999. 
1992-1999 Various 0.951 - 0.58 Foreign and local investors. 
Source: World Bank privatisation database for data until 1999 and IFC privatisation database for 2000 data. World Bank (1993), Gerchunoff and Coloma (1993), 
and Herteneck and McMahon (1996) for information about the restructured units (i.e. column 2).  
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Full List of companies included in the Argentinean privatisation programme:122 
 
1- Telecommunication: ‘Empresa Nacional de la Telecomunicaciones’ (ENTel); the national 
telecommunication company. 
2- Airline: ‘Aerolíneas Argentinas’ (AA); The national Argentine airline company 
3- Petroleum: sale of some share of the petroleum company (YPF). 
4- Natural gas: ‘Gas del Estado’ (GdE). 
5- Waterworks: ‘Obras Sanitarias de la Nación’ (OSN); The Greater Buenos Aires Water 
supply and Sewerage company 
6- Electricity: ‘Servicios Eléctricos del Gran Buenos Aires’ SEGBA; The Electricity company 
serving Greater Buenos Aires area,  ‘Agua y Energía Eléctrica’ (AyE); the electricity 
company serving the rest of the country, and Hidronor; the company that operates 
several hydro-generation stations. 
7- Railroads and the Buenos Aires subway: ‘Ferrocarriles Argentinos’ (FA). 
8- National highways. 
9- Shipping, ports and grain handling. 
10- Money printing. 
11- Mail services: ‘Empresa Nacional de Correos y Telégrafos’ (ENCOTel). 
12- A savings and insurance company: ‘Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro’ (CNAS). 
13- A hotel. 
14- A race track. 
15- Two television stations. 
16- Petrochemical plants. 
17- Steel manufacturing. 
18- Military and defence-related industries (e.g. assembly of airplanes). 
19- The sale of surplus public land and buildings 
20- The closure of bankrupted or uneconomic SOEs (such as the National Development 
Bank, and an iron mining plant in the south of the country). 
 
There have been also some privatisations at the provincial and municipal levels. Examples of 
these privatisations include provincial banks123, major winery, refuse collection, casinos, bus 
stations and bus lines, city zoos … etc.124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 The World Bank (1993), pp.2-3, and Alexander and Corti (1993), p.3 
123 For details on Provincial Banks privatisations, see Clarke and Cull (1998a, 1998b, and 1999)  
124 Harteneck and McMahon (1996), p. 76. 
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Table 7: Private Investment Laws in Egypt between 1974 – 2000a 
Law 43 of 1974 Law 159 of 1981 Law 230 of 1989 Law 8 of 1997  
Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions 
Coverage Manufacturing 
& Mining; 
Tourism; Land 
reclamation; 
Agriculture & 
Livestock 
production; 
Building 
materials; 
housing; real 
estate 
development. 
FI in Banking 
and Insurance is 
limited to 
operations 
dealing in 
foreign 
currencies only.  
same GOFI may deny 
investments in 
activities where 
existing 
production is 
judged to be 
sufficient 
(usually 
activities where 
SOEs are 
heavily 
involved) 
  16 investment 
activitiesb are 
guaranteed to 
receive 
automatic 
approval.  
 
The Cabinet of 
Ministers is 
free to add 
other activities 
to this list. 
Prior approval 
is required for 
investments 
related to: 
Military 
production and 
tobacco, or 
taking place in 
Sinai. 
 
Other 
regulations 
organise 
investments in 
the petroleum 
and insurance 
sectors, and 
BOT 
arrangements 
for highways 
and airports.c 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Max. 51% 
foreign equity. 
 51% foreign, 
can be 
extended to 
100% if there is 
lack of 
Egyptian 
subscription 
within 1 month 
of the start of 
the project. 
 100%  100%  
Capital 
Repatriation 
Allowed;  given 
the approval of 
the Investment 
Authority. 
Not before 5 
years of the 
commencement 
of the project, 
and paid in 5 
instalments. 
 Restriction on 
amount of 
capital 
repatriated. 
Allowed subject 
to GAFI 
approval 
 No restrictions.  
Foreign 
ownership of 
Land/property 
 NO Possible 
ownership of 
property 
No foreign 
ownership of 
land. 
Yes   Yes for both 
property and 
land.d 
 
  
 40 
Law 43 of 1974 Law 159 of 1981 Law 230 of 1989 Law 8 of 1997  
Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions 
Labour    Egyptians must 
constitute 90% 
of workers, and 
the majority of 
top 
management; 
Wages of 
Egyptian 
workers are not 
to be less than 
7% of total 
wages paid by 
the company to 
its overall 
labour force; 
10% of profit to 
be distributed 
to workers. 
 At least 10% of 
profits are to be 
allocated for 
workers. 
No restrictions. 
Distribution of 
profits to 
workers is left 
to the 
discretion of 
the company. 
Labour laws 
are still 
relatively 
inflexible, 
especially 
regarding firing 
employees. 
Tax Incentives Tax holidays for 
5 years; 
reduction of tax 
on capital and 
machinery 
imports. 
   More tax 
incentives to 
projects in new 
communities, 
tax holidays up 
to 10 years. 
Projects in free 
zone areas are 
exempted 
inland tax 
laws. 
 More tax 
holidays and 
incentives; 
most notably: 
tax holidays of 
10 years for 
projects in new 
industrialised 
areas and new 
communities; 
and 20 years 
for projects 
located outside 
the Old Valley. 
 
Imported 
machinery 
required for the 
project is 
subject to 
unified 5% tax 
of the value of 
the imported 
machinery.   
 
Trade  Import/Export       
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Law 43 of 1974 Law 159 of 1981 Law 230 of 1989 Law 8 of 1997  
Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions Provisions Restrictions 
licensing 
required. 
Others    Possible Price 
and profit 
controls 
  No control on 
pricing or profit 
policies. 
 
Implementing 
Body 
  GOFI Bureaucratic 
process of 
approval and 
registration. 
  GAFI; 
registration is 
within one 
week. 
 
 
Notes: 
a: Information compiled from UNCTAD (1999a); Obeid (2002); Ott (1991); Sherif and Soos (1992); and Pripstein Posusney (1992). 
b: The 16 activities are: Land reclamation; fishing, poultry and animal production; industry and mining; tourism; maritime transportation; refrigerated 
transportation and related services, air transportation and related services; housing; real estate development; oil production and related services; hospitals and 
medical centres; Infrastructure: water pumping stations, electricity, roads and communication; venture capital; computer software production; projects financed by 
the Social Fund for Development; leasing; risk capital and guarantees for subscription in securities; petroleum refining; and cinema production. (UNCTAD, 1999a, p. 
20) 
c: Foreign investment in the petroleum sector is governed by concession agreements between  the investors and the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC). 
Foreign investment in the local insurance market is regulated by Law 91 of 1995. Build-Operate-Transfer projects for highways and airports are regulated by law 
229 of 1996 and law 3 of 1997. 
d: GOE does not allow industrial projects to be established on agricultural land.  
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Table 8: Corruption Perception Index for Egypt and Argentina 
Egypt Argentina Year 
Score Rank Score Rank 
1980 – 1985 
1988 – 1992 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
1.12 
1.75 
n.a. 
2.84 
n.a. 
2.90 
3.30 
3.10 
3.60 
3.40 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
41 out of 54 
n.a. 
66 out of 85 
63 out of 99 
63 out of 90 
54 out of 91 
62 out of 102 
4.94 
5.91 
5.24 
3.41 
2.81 
3.00 
3.00 
3.50 
3.50 
2.80 
n.a. 
n.a. 
24 out of 41 
35 out of 54 
42 out of 52 
61 out of 85 
71 out of 99  
52 out of 90 
57 out of 91 
70 out of 102 
Source: Data for 1980/85 and 1988/92 are from Universität Göttingen website 
(www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/histor.htm), and data for 1995 and 1996 are from Transparency International (TI) 
website (www.transparency.org), accessed on 13/11/02. The remaining data are from Transparency 
International website, accessed on 28/7/06. 
 
Figure A1: Share of FDI in GDP (1970-2000) in Argentina and Egypt 
FDI as a percentage of GDP (5-year moving average) 1970-2000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Years
%
Argentina Egypt
 
Source: Calculated from the WDI (2002) 
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Table 9: Comparison between the Argentine and Egyptian cases of privatisation and FDI policies 
Criteria Argentina Egypt 
Public Sector (PS): 
Duration of dominance: 
 
Share of PS in GDP: 
 
Financial deficit 
 
 
External financing 
 
 
Privatisation Programme 
Macroeconomic conditions: 
 
Starting Date: 
 
No. of SOEs  
 
Dominant sector: 
 
 
Employment 
 
 
Public and Political Support: 
 
Institutional Framework 
 
 
 
Speed of Application 
 
 
Total Proceeds till 2000: 
 
FDI Participation in Privatisation: 
Legal framework: 
 
 
Just over 40 years before privatisation took place. 
 
7% 
 
In 1989, 5.2% of GDPa (for the largest 13 SOEs) 
 
In 1988, $ 11 billion in external debt 
 
 
 
 
Hyperinflation (3000%), High external debt (85%) 
 
1989 
 
260 non financial, and 37 financial.  
 
Infrastructure (in terms of number), Energy (in terms of 
proceeds) 
 
In 1990, 310,000 employee (i.e. 2.5% of labour force or 
1% of population)b 
 
Very strong 
 
Centralised monitoring and decentralised implementation. 
The System of Trustees ensures commitment to 
privatisation. 
 
Rapid. Most of the SOEs were privatised (i.e. 2/3) within 
the first 5 years. 
 
$ 44.581 billion 
 
 
The privatisation legal framework adopted the US/UK 
legal model, which offered enough guarantees to foreign 
 
30 years before privatisation took place. 
 
EAs (20%), PEs (10%)  
 
In 1983, 8.4% of GDP 
 
Over 1975-1989, USAID gave $14.98 billion to GOE, 
95% of it went to the government, out of which 8% (or 
$1.2 billion) went to industrialised SOEs alone. 
 
 
Sever external debt (111.7%), High inflation (21.24%) 
 
1991- First sale in 1993. 
 
314 non financial. 
 
Manufacturing (in terms of both numbers and proceeds of 
privatisation) 
 
In 1991, 1.1 million employee (i.e. 6% of labour force or 
2%c of population) 
 
Relatively Weak 
 
Conflict of interests; members of the monitoring 
Ministerial Committee are also managers of the AFs.  
 
 
Slow. First two years were spent in preparing the SOEs. 
2/3 of the SOEs were privatised within 10 years. 
 
$ 4.481 billion 
 
 
Privatisation legal framework is not clear on which 
investment law will be applied on a privatised company 
  
 44 
Criteria Argentina Egypt 
 
 
 
 
Size: 
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment: 
Legal Framework: 
 
 
 
 
 
Monitoring/ implementing bodies: 
 
 
Rank of host country among developing countries:
d
  
 
Sectoral Distribution: 
 
 
 
 
Sources of FDI: 
 
 
 
Potentiality and Performance:
e
  
investors.  
 
 
 
Large.  
By 2000, total FDI was $27.887 billion (i.e. 63% of 
privatisation proceeds). 
 
 
Foreign Investment Law in 1991. Removed all restrictions 
on FDI, no prior permission is required, registration is 
optional, 100% ownership allowed except in the media 
and defence sectors. 
 
 
The National Registry of Foreign Investment. 
(Registration is optional) 
 
8 (during the 1970s and 1980s) then 4 (during the 1990s) 
 
FDI is concentrated more in public utilities/ Services 
(37%), followed by manufacturing (31%) and Petroleum 
(14%) 
 
 
In the 1990s, USA is the major source of FDI (36%), 
followed by Europe (23%) and neighbouring countries 
(15%). 
 
Above-potential (1988-1990), then Front-Runner (1998-
2000) 
with majority foreign ownership. Plus dispute settlement 
has been often highlighted as one of the obstacles to FDI 
in Egypt. 
 
Small 
By 2000, total FDI was $1.090 billion (i.e. 24% of 
privatisation proceeds).  
 
 
Multiple laws. Two main active laws that cover the 
majority of sectors: Law 159 of 1981, Law 8 of 1997. The 
latter offers more incentives and liberalisation. Specific 
sectors such as Petroleum, Insurance, and airports are 
regulated by other investment laws. 
 
GOFI for companies under law 159 of 1981, and GAFI for 
companies under law 8 of 1997. 
 
6 (during 1970s and 1980s) then 22 (during 1990s). 
 
 
FDI is concentrated in Manufacturing (33%), followed by 
free zones (19%), financial sector (18%), and tourism 
(17%). The services sector accounts only for 3% 
 
Saudi Arabia (15.5%), followed by UK (11.2%) and USA 
(6.9%) 
 
 
Above-Potential (1988-1990), then Below-potential 
(1998-2000) 
Source: compiled by the researcher. 
Notes:  
a: Calculated by the researcher: Deficit/GDP = 4 billion/ 76.6 billion, where GDP is in current US$ and obtained from WDI (2002), and the deficit for the largest 13 enterprise is from Saba and Manzetti 
(1997), p. 355 and also in Pastor Jr. and Wise (1999), p. 487. 
b: percentages are calculated by the researcher based on 1990 total labour force of 12.20 million and total population of 32.53 million, obtained from WDI (2002). 
c: percentage is calculated by the researcher based on 1991 total population of 53.62 million, obtained from WDI (2002). 
d: World Investment Report (various issues). 
e: WIR (2002).  
 
